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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
IN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 



VALUES 

IMMEDIATE AND CONTRIBUTORY 

AND THEIR INTERRELATION 



VALUES 

IMMEDIATE AND 

CONTRIBUTORY 

AND THEIR INTERRELATION 



By 

MAURICE PI CARD, Ph.D. 

Lecturer in Philosophy in Barnard College 




THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS 

32 Waverly Place, New York City 

1920 



Copyright 1920, by 
The New York Univeesity Press 






THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS 

COMMITTEE OF PUBLICATION 

Arthur Huntington Nason, Ph.D., Chairman 
Director of the Press 

Earle Brownell Babcock, Ph.D. 

Harold Dickinson Senior, M.B., Sc.D., F.R.C.S. 



n»3 



KENNEBEC JOURNAL PRESS, AUGUSTA, MAINE 



PREFACE 

IT would seem that an apology is due from 
me to Professor W. M. Urban for not 
having discussed his significant contribu- 
tion to value-philosophy, entitled, Valuation, Its 
Nature and Laws. My omission is not due to 
any failure to recognize that Professor Urban 
is, in this country, the most eminent repre- 
sentative of a large school of value-philosophers, 
among whom are A. Meinong, C. V. Ehrenfels, 
and G. Simmel. My reason for not discussing 
their views in the present work is similar to that 
which prompted me to pass by Miinsterberg's 
The Eternal Values. Here are two schools of 
value-philosophy with presuppositions radically 
different from my own. That school which 
Professor Urban so well represents finds the 
locus of value in the "worth-fundamental," dis- 
covered by an analysis of mental life. Miinster- 
berg finds value in the region of the human will, 
and he believes that value implies an over- 
personal, metaphysically absolute will. Both 
find value primarily to be a quality which colors 
certain mental states — Miinsterberg believes 
that it points toward an objective " Oversell" 
In contrast to this subjective point of de- 



vi PREFACE 

parture, I have treated value as relational, occur- 
ring in definite situations. I have used the 
psychological basis of values not as the sum and 
substance of valuation, but as a description of 
one term of value-relations, the other term, that 
of the environment, calling for equal attention. 
Thus I have been able to avoid the acrostic phil- 
osophy of the value-psychologists, which tends 
in the direction of epistemological realism, and 
the lack of concreteness incidental to it. I may 
note, however, that Professor Urban considers 
briefly, in the last chapter of his book, some of 
the problems which I discuss in detail. 

To Professor Herman Harrell Home of New 
York University, I am indebted for numerous 
suggestions and for a final reading of the proof; 
and to Professor Arthur Huntington Nason, 
Director of the New York University Press, 
for critical oversight of publication. Above 
all, however, my gratitude is due to Professor 
Dickinson S. Miller of General Theological 
Seminary, for his kindness in reading my man- 
uscript and making many helpful suggestions 
as to the method of treatment of my subject. 

M. P. 
New York City, 
January 31, 1920. 



CONTENTS 



Introduction 



PART I 

THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES 

Chapter I. Two Classes of Values 7 

Values as means or 'given as good,' 
7. — Their psychological basis in cog- 
nition and feeling, 9. — Independent 
character of contributory values, 13. — 
Objective and subjective, 14. — Ques- 
tionable status of logical, moral, and 
aesthetic values, 15. — Distinction be- 
tween values and value- judgments, 16. 

Chapter II. Truth and Immediate Value . . 20 
Verification vs. recognition, 20. — Rick- 
ert's argument, 21. — Metaphysics and 
epistemology, 24. — Truth a matter of 
inference, not simple affirmation, 25. — 
Rickert's psychologizing tendency, 26. 
— Various oppositions, 28. 



Chapter III. The Interrelation op Values 

with Respect to Their Origin. . 31 
Values not dependent upon presence 
of judgment, 32. — Standpoints of the 
agent and the observer, 33.— Value and 
the earliest stage of consciousness, 36. — 

vii 



viii VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

Presence of interest the criterion of 
presence of value, 38. — Biological con- 
comitants of the earliest value-situation, 
39. — Values from the observer's stand- 
point all contributory, 43. — Introspec- 
tive and sympathetic methods, 44. — 
Earliest stage of the standpoint of 
the individual, 45. — Introspective deter- 
mination of values of this stage, 46. — 
Values in the earliest stages of con- 
sciousness, 48. — Sensations and feeling- 
attitudes, 48. — Two directions of the 
development of conscious activity, 50. 

Chapter IV. The Interrelation op Values 

with Respect to Knowledge . . 54 
Judgments as values and judgments 
of values, 54. — The value of acts of 
judgment, 57. — Content of judgments 
and their future usefulness, 59. — True 
judgments and their value, 61. — Value 
of false judgments, 66. — Degrees of 
contributory value, 69. — Value of theo- 
retical judgments, 73. — Limits of the 
discussion of judgments of values, j6. 
Origin of immediate judgments, 78. — 
Origin of contributory judgments, 80. — 
Tendency of contributory judgments 
to become independent of particular in- 
dividual needs, 82. 



Chapter V. The Interrelation op Values 
with Respect to Their Co-exis- 
tence 85 






CONTENTS ix 

Different uses of the term 'environ- 
ment', 85. — Biological and psychological 
uses, 88. — Difference between the bio- 
logical viewpoint and that of instru- 
mental pragmatism, 90. — Environment 
and perception, 92. — Relevant disputes 
about aspects of consciousness, 94. — 
Conscious activity related to environ- 
ment through cognition and feeling, 97. 
Contact with environment through feel- 
ing, 99. — Cognitive and affective rela- 
tions of conscious activity, 104. — Rela- 
tion of mature to primitive conscious 
activity, 106. — Sensation as a bridge 
between cognition and feeling, no. — 
Further deductions, 112. 

PART II 

WINDELBAND'S THEORY OF NORMS 

Chapter VI. Subjective and Objective 119 

The place of function in value-rela- 
tions, 119. — Are tastes objective or sub- 
jective? 121. — Possible existence of 
norms, 122. — Attractiveness of theory 
of objective immediate values, 124. 

Chapter VII. The Theory op Norms 126 

I. Kant or Realism? 128 

Windelband's contradictory theories, 
129. — Norms and natural laws, 130. — 
Relation of norms to particular con- 
sciousnesses, 132. 



x VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

II. Evolution and the Norms 134 

Qualitative and quantitative factors, 
135. — Their incompatability with the 
theory of natural selection, 136. 

III. The Parallel between Denken, 

Fuklen, and Wollen 137 

Falsity of the parallel between Den- 
ken and Wollen, 137. — A psychological 
scruple, 139. 

IV. The Independence of the Norms 

of Particular Consciousnesses . . 140 
Independence of particular conscious- 
nesses not proved for norms, 141. — The 
case for parallelism of three realms of 
norms, 145. — Evolution of morality 
does not presuppose norms of morality, 
148. — Supposition of moral and logical 
norms unnecessary, 152. — Aesthetic 
appreciations and the law of sur- 
vival, 153. 

V. Freedom and Responsibility 155 

Freedom said to subsist in determined 
processes, 157. — Assumption of auton- 
omy on part of the individual, 160. — 
Causality, necessity, and responsibility, 
162. — Ambiguity in use of the word 
'character', 165. — Choice of possible de- 
cisions, 166. — Responsibility as a func- 
tion of the judgment, 169. 

Windelband's General Position . . 172 

Conclusion 175 



VALUES 

IMMEDIATE AND CONTRIBUTORY 

AND THEIR INTERRELATION 



INTRODUCTION 

IN this thesis, I purpose taking as my start- 
ing point the general agreement among 
writers as to the existence of values be- 
longing to two distinct classes, immediate and 
contributory. In order to put the distinction 
between the two classes beyond question, I shall 
limit the class " immediate " to those immediate 
values which are agreed to be subjective, i.e., 
dependent for their existence upon some par- 
ticular individual who holds them as values. 
The propositions, therefore, which I shall as- 
sume to be matters of general agreement are, 
" There is a class of values which may be named 
i contributory \" " All contributory values are 
objective." " There is another class of values 
which may be termed ' immediate \" " Some 
immediate values are subjective." 

Having distinguished two classes of values 
as subject-matter for discussion, I proceed to 
treat of their interrelations. But, before this 
can be done effectually, it is found to be neces- 
sary to disprove a theory which, if true, would 
render the distinction between immediate and 



4 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

contributory values of slight importance. It 
has been held that the values known as con- 
tributory are dependent for their validity upon 
certain a priori immediate values because all 
truth is said to rest upon immediate recognition 
of its presence. I therefore devote a chapter 
to disproving this theory. 

With two classes of values of unquestioned 
distinction, I next discuss their interrelation 
with reference to their origin, with reference 
to knowledge, and with reference to their co- 
existence. 

Part II examines immediate values with a 
view to demonstrating that there are no ob- 
jective immediate values. This result confirms 
the validity of the initial distinction between 
objective-contributory and subjective-immediate 
values, and carries the proposition " Some im- 
mediate values are subjective " to the wider 
application of the proposition " It cannot be 
proved that there are any immediate values 
which are not subjective." 



PART I 
THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES 



CHAPTER I 

TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 

THE method to be pursued, as stated in 
the introduction, is to begin the dis- 
cussion by finding some point of agree- 
ment among writers on value. It is not to be 
expected that there may be discovered groups 
of values to whose clear cut distinctions all 
writers will subscribe. It is not unlikely, how- 
ever, that there may exist a fundamental dis- 
tinction in kind between certain values and cer- 
tain other values, and that the points at issue 
may be due to differences of opinion as to the 
correct assignment of other particular values. 
First, I shall point out two radically different 
types of value; secondly, I shall indicate the 
nature of those values which may not be as- 
signed summarily to one of the two classes. 

§ i. The distinction which I have in mind 
is between contributory or instrumental values 
and immediate values. The adjectives " instru- 
mental " and " immediate " indicate that the 
distinction is a logical one, distinguishing values 
as given goods or as means. Contributory 

7 



8 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

values are not self-sufficient; they look beyond 
themselves to some end-in-view. They com- 
prise objects that are "good for" something, 
or acts that conduce to the attainment of some 
specific end. Thus, this pen is good for writ- 
ing; apples are good for food. I visit my 
physician in order to obtain treatment from 
him; he prescribes for me in order that I may 
get well. Pen, apples, and the acts of visiting 
and treatment are of contributory value. 

Immediate values, on the other hand, are 
" non-mediate." They do not look forward to 
an end, but are intrinsic, self-sufficient. They 
are ends-in-themselves in the sense that they 
are simply given as good when stated, requiring 
neither reference to any object or act beyond 
themselves, nor verification of any kind. Of 
such character are objects and acts which I like, 
demand, admire, approve, wish, want, etc. I 
admire a beautiful vase; it thus becomes of 
value to me, irrespective of any other vases 
that I admire. I disapprove of the act of taking 
human life; the act of killing thereby becomes 
of negative value to me. Sailing and smoking 
are valuable to me. 

8 2. The fundamental character of the dis- 



TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 9 

tinction between immediate and contributory 
values will appear when their psychological 
basis is taken into account. Observe first that 
objects and acts of contributory value demand 
for their existence other objects or acts to which 
they may be related. They cannot stand alone. 
For a government note to be of the value of 
ten dollars, the ten dollars must actually exist 
somewhere. Apples, considered as good for 
food, imply the existence of some suitable diges- 
tive apparatus. If my visit to my physician is 
to be valuable as a means to getting well, I must 
now be capable of improvement in health beyond 
my present state. Now, as both contributory 
and instrumental values are here spoken of with 
reference to man, it is obvious that the psycho- 
logical basis of contributory values must be 
sought in some aspect of the human mind by 
which objects and acts may be related to other 
objects and acts. Cognition alone satisfies this 
requirement. We may say, therefore, that con- 
tributory values are closely associated with 
the cognitive aspect of consciousness, where 
comparison, memory, and reasoning furnish a 
mechanism for relating portions of our ex- 
perience. 



io VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

Immediate values, on the other hand, do not 
require relation of two ideas in consciousness. 
They are simple, unique, self-sufficing facts. 
They are matters of taste, and " de gustibus 
non disputandum." What is the importance of 
the cognitive aspect of conscious activity with 
respect to such values? Must I know them in 
order to have them? Not any more than that 
the leopard must know that he has spots in 
order to have them. Knowledge of values, 
therefore, is quite distinct from values them- 
selves, and we shall do well always to bear this 
fact in mind. 

If cognition is merely incidental to immediate 
values, the psychological basis of immediate 
values must be sought in some aspect of con- 
sciousness other than the cognitive aspect. There 
remain, in the popular division, the fields of will 
and feeling. The words " like," " demand," 
"want," "admire," "approve," "wish," etc., 
which describe the type of relation that exists 
between the individual and the objects or acts 
which he immediately values, are all expressive 
of feeling. It is also noteworthy that, if the 
feeling is toward an object or act which the 
individual is not possessing or doing at the 



TWO CLASSES OF VALUES n 

time, there is also frequently present an impulse 
to gain possession of the object or to do the act. 
If I am sufficiently eager to sail, I am impelled 
to go down to the lake to get the boat ready. 
If my liking for peanuts affects me deeply, I 
am likely to go out and buy some. It appears, 
therefore, that immediate values are also closely 
associated with the will-aspect of consciousness, 
and this can be said without committing oneself 
to any particular theory as to the nature of that 
will-aspect. In the case of contributory values, 
however, there is a hypothetical characteristic 
which makes their relation to will quite differ- 
ent. Apples are good for food if I am hungry. 
My pen is good for writing when I want to 
write. In these examples, there is no impulse 
aroused by the act of contributory valuation; 
I may put the object or the act valued to service 
whenever a suitable occasion is presented, but 
the object or act will not itself create the occa- 
sion. I may conclude, therefore, that will and 
feeling are peculiarly associated with immediate 
values, and cognition with contributory values. 
§ 3. I must not leave this preliminary con- 
sideration of the psychological basis of value 
without a caution and a deduction. The cau- 



12 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

tion is that the assignment of two classes of 
values to different fields of psychological mani- 
festation must not be held to imply that the 
individual ever acts exclusively in any one 
" field " of consciousness. Cognition, feeling, 
and will are aspects of a conscious activity 
which is undivided. The distinction with refer- 
ence to value is one of emphasis rather than 
one of division. More than that, the distinction 
implies that we human beings, in our discussion 
and discrimination of values, recognize that we 
value things in different ways, according as we 
think, feel, or do them. But this is not to deny 
the presence of a minimum of feeling and im- 
pulse necessary to the presence of a thought. 
There are all gradations of emphasis of cog- 
nition, feeling, and will in conscious activity, 
and it is not unlikely that we may find situa- 
tions of conscious activity in which both classes 
of value are simultaneously present. The inter- 
relation of the two classes is, in fact, a subject 
of future discussion in this thesis. At this 
juncture, it is necessary only to point out that 
I do not mean to isolate any "field" of con- 
sciousness in the act, but only to emphasize that 
the two classes of value refer exclusively to 
different aspects of conscious activity. 



TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 13 

The deduction which I wish to make is that 
contributory values have a measure of inde- 
pendence of any one individual, which imme- 
diate values cannot claim. Two facts make 
this evident: (a) The cognitive function by its 
process of comparison and relation of ideas one 
to another makes contributory values independ- 
ent of a particular time or moment in the activ- 
ity of the individual. If my umbrella is good 
for keeping off the rain, it is good for that 
purpose when next it rains, be it today, next 
Wednesday, or next month. I may verify con- 
tributory values. I may find out what my um- 
brella is good for. (b) The cognitive function 
has developed the convenient method of expres- 
sion of ideas of one individual to another by 
means of speech. It is conceivable that I might 
demonstrate the use of my umbrella to a soaked 
friend by gestures, but words greatly facilitate 
the process. In this way, contributory values 
are made independent not only of any special 
moment in the life of an individual, but also of 
any particular individual. This is in marked 
contrast with immediate values: the communi- 
cation of my likes and dislikes to my neighbor 
is a matter of some difficulty, and sympathetic 



14 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

feeling always lacks something of the flavor of 
the original experience. 

§ 4. With some care, the terms " objective " 
and " subjective " may be used to signify the 
distinction between immediate and contributory 
values. The independence which has just been 
recognized as characteristic of contributory 
values makes " objective " an appropriate des- 
ignation for them. If such values pass as coin 
among the members of a community, they must 
cling to the object rather than to the persons 
who employ them. This is not to say, however, 
that they would be values at all apart from the 
relation of the objects to individuals who value 
them, but they may be called " objective " in 
deference to the fact that they do not depend 
for their existence upon any particular member 
of a community. 

§ 5. The term " subjective," in contrast, is 
applicable to at least some immediate values, in 
view of the fact that they cannot exist apart 
from the conscious activity of some particular 
individual. 

§ 6. The second task which I set for myself 
at the beginning of the chapter was that of 
indicating certain classes of values over whose 



TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 15 

position there is some dispute. The current 
differences of opinion are nearly all due to one 
fact, namely, that it is possible to use the cog- 
nitive function of conscious activity to express 
in thought and language facts of immediate 
value. 

As we have seen, it is necessary that there 
be a cognitive minimum in order to be conscious 
of an immediate value. This element, however, 
at first at a minimum, may grow to the very 
limit of cognitive development and attain ex- 
pression in the judgment. If apples are of 
immediate value, I may think of them as such, 
and I may make the judgment, " I like apples." 
Some writers now argue thus : " I like apples " 
is a judgment. Judgments are capable of veri- 
fication. But immediate values do not demand 
verification. Therefore judgments of immedi- 
ate values are immediately true. It is further 
argued that truth, not only of value-judgments 
but also all truth, is of immediate value, because, 
it is claimed, in judgment there is always an 
element of approval or disapproval on the part 
of the judging individual. Clearly, therefore, 
truth is a value whose assignment is in dispute, 
if, indeed, it be a value at all. 



16 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

Again, in the judgment " I admire the vase," 
there is expressed a fact of immediate value. 
Suppose that, in my admiration, I pronounce it 
beautiful. Is the beauty a quality of the vase, 
or only my feeling toward it? If the beauty 
is in the vase, there must be some standard of 
beauty outside my consciousness, and the imme- 
diate value of appreciation of the beautiful will 
not be subjective, but objective. The place of 
aesthetic values, therefore, is in dispute. 

Again, in judging an action to be good, am 
I expressing only my feeling toward it, or is my 
feeling governed by the presence of an objective 
standard of moral value which I instinctively 
recognize? Is it true that there is nothing 
good or bad, but thinking makes it so? Or is 
there a moral standard, quite independent of 
my sentiments, which is valid for all time? The 
place of moral values, therefore, is in dispute. 

§ 7. To discuss these disputed points will be 
a part of what follows. At this point, however, 
it is suitable to distinguish carefully between a 
fact of immediate value, and the expression of 
that same fact in a judgment about immediate 
value. My feeling toward the vase is quite a 
distinct and separate thing from the judgment 



TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 17 

" The vase is beautiful." The one does not 
necessitate the other. I might like the vase, 
and never put my liking into words; or I might 
say, " The vase, no doubt, is beautiful, but I 
feel no liking for it." Judgments of immediate 
values, therefore, do not derive immediacy from 
the immediate values which they state. The 
psychological basis outlined earlier in the chap- 
ter must be preserved. Judgments, even judg- 
ments of immediate value, since they fall within 
the field of cognition, must be classed with con- 
tributory values, if they are values at all. And 
strange as it may appear, the judgment that a 
vase is immediately beautiful will be found to 
be of contributory value. 1 

Discussion of the possible existence of ob- 
jective moral and aesthetic standards may be 
postponed to a later chapter. But discussion 
of the status of truth may not be postponed, 
because, if truth should be found to be imme- 
diate and antecedent to judgment, the distinc- 
tion between immediate and contributory values 
would be of slight consequence. There would 
then be too little separation between certain 
values with reference to the cognitive function 

1 Cf. page 58. 



18 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

and certain other values with reference to the 
feeling-function of conscious activity to make 
the distinction worth while. My next task, 
therefore, is that of discussing the place of 
truth in a classification of values. 

The substance of this chapter may be sum- 
marized as follows: 

§ i. It is generally agreed that there are two 
groups of values which are distinct and separate 
and which may be named immediate and con- 
tributory values. 

The distinction is a logical one: contributory 
values are means to ends; immediate values are 
given as good. 

§ 2. The psychological basis of contributory 
values is the cognitive aspect of conscious activ- 
ity; that of immediate values is the feeling- 
aspect, often joined with the will-aspect. 

§ 3. It is not implied that any aspect of con- 
sciousness functions without the presence of the 
other aspects. 

§ 4. " Objective " applied to contributory 
values means that they do not depend for their 
existence upon a particular individual. " Sub- 
jective " applied to immediate values means 



TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 19 

that they do depend for their existence upon 
some particular individual. 

§ 5. It is generally agreed that contributory 
values are objective in this sense; and that some 
immediate values are subjective. 

§ 6. Whether there are objective immediate 
values, in the realms of truth, beauty, and mor- 
ality, is a disputed question. 

§ 7. Confusion between the classes of con- 
tributory and immediate values has been due 
largely to the fact that it is possible to make 
judgments as to immediate values. 



CHAPTER II 

TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 

A CHIEF distinction between immediate 
and contributory values is that the 
latter admit of verification, while the 
former do not. If a friend tells me that a cer- 
tain brand of soap is good for taking off dirt, 
I can very quickly find out for myself whether 
what he says is true or not. I can discover 
whether soap is contributory to the end of cleans- 
ing. But if my friend tells me that he likes a 
perfume, I cannot verify the immediate value of 
his liking. He simply likes it, and it is valuable 
to him without any ado. Whether I find it 
agreeable, or what his other friends think about 
it, makes no difference; for him, it is of imme- 
diate value. 

Certain writers, however, tell us that the veri- 
fication of the soap as contributory to cleansing 
is not merely a matter of using it and watching 
its effect upon the skin. They say that the 
process of trial and observation is of secondary 
importance beside recognition of the truth that 
soap cleanses. And this recognition, they say, 

20 



TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 21 

has nothing to do with verification, but is based 
on a powerful compulsion of the feeling-side of 
consciousness to assent to it as true. Truth, 
they say, is thus an immediate value. 

Now if truth be an immediate value, all those 
values which I designated as contributory are, 
in the last analysis, immediate, or, at least, based 
on immediate values. My whole thesis, on the 
other hand, assumes that there are the two 
classes of values, immediate and contributory, 
and that they are coordinate in rank. It be- 
comes of first importance, therefore, to disprove 
the theory that truth is an immediate value. 

A very subtle psychological argument has 
been advanced to prove this theory. The keen- 
est piece of analysis in its support has been 
made by H. Rickert in his Der Gegenstand der 
Erkenntnis. 1 It will be profitable to summarize 
and criticize Rickert's position. 

Starting with the classic conception of truth 
as located in the judgment, 2 Rickert emphasizes 
the practical character of knowledge. He ob- 
serves that there is no truth where there is only 
a succession of perceptions, and that the fully 

1 Rickert, H., Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, Tubingen und 
Leipzig, 2 AufL, 1904. 

2 Op. tit., 84 ff. 



22 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

developed logical judgment appears only when 
the individual takes an interest (Anteil) in the 
perceptions. He says that affirmation or nega- 
tion is logically implied in all judgments which 
are held to contain knowledge in the sense of 
true knowledge. Thus, knowing is appreci- 
ating (Kennen ist Erkennen). But apprecia- 
tion has to do only with values; therefore truth 
is a value. The value truth is coordinate with 
values derived from willing and feeling; that 
is, truth is an immediate value. The usual 
opposition made between perceptions and judg- 
ments, on the one hand, and feeling and willing, 
on the other, is false; the true opposition is 
between perceiving, on the one hand, and judg- 
ments of affirmation and negation together with 
feeling and willing, on the other. Affirmation 
and negation, since they are expressive of inter- 
est, are a kind of approval or disapproval, pleas- 
ure or displeasure. Knowing is a process deter- 
mined through the feelings. But truth differs 
from the appreciation that comes with feelings 
other than affirmation or negation, in that the 
appreciation that comes with chance feelings 
(i.e., immediate values) is unstable, whereas 
the feeling that appreciates truth is timeless. 



TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 23 

A necessity of judgment is here felt, different 
from the necessity of perceiving (causal neces- 
sity). Necessity of judgment is logical neces- 
sity, Sollen, in contradistinction to Mussen. 
Sollen precedes Sein in existential judgments, 
because Sein is only expressible by a judgment. 
Now if this doctrine is sound, it is obvious 
that any separation of two classes of values, 
one of which excludes the element of judgment, 
is vitiated. For Rickert makes the true judg- 
ment dependent upon a necessary feeling of 
appreciation; that is, he makes of it an imme- 
diate value. According to his theory, the truth 
of my judgment " The tree is green " is ground- 
ed in a transcendental Sollen which compels me 
to judge it as green, if I judge at all. There 
is an immediate feeling of affirmation, appreci- 
ation, recognition, which requires me to say 
" green " rather than blue or red. Every fact 
implies a judgment. 3 In the preceding chapter, 4 
I made the distinction between facts of imme- 
diate value and judgment concerning the truth 
or falsity of these facts. According to Rickert, 
I must have fallen into that " Positivismus, der 
die ' Tatsache * und ihre Konst aliening fur das 

3 Op. cit., 130. 

4 Page 16. 

3 



24 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

einzige und letzte ansieht, was den Philosophen 
kummert" 5 It is necessary, therefore, at this 
point to criticize Rickert's position: 

§ i. The doctrine that Sein depends upon a 
transcendental Sollen, is equivalent to saying 
that metaphysics is dependent upon epistemol- 
ogy, and many are the objections against such 
a position. 6 Here it may be remarked that 
Rickert, as all others who adopt that standpoint, 
does not live up to his doctrine. If it be true, 
as he states on p. 130, that existential facts 
imply a prior judgment, correct method would 
demand the proof of his theory on the basis of 
necessary judgments. Such a theory must not 
be constructed from any materials outside the 
sphere of judgments recognized (appreciated) 
as true. What apparently contradicts such a 
requirement is to be found on pp. 88-89. ^ n 
these pages, Rickert distinguishes between the 
quaestio facti of psychology and the quaestio 
juris of epistemology. He says that psychology 
is concerned with Sein, but he adds, " Sieht 
man die Feststellung solcher Tatsachen als 
Aufgabe der Psychologie an, so muss auch die 

5 Rickert. op. cit., 130. 

6 Cf. Marvin, W. T., The New Realism, 43-95. 



TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 25 

Behandlung der Frage nach dem erkenntnis- 
theoretischen Wesen des Urteils mit psycho- 
logischen Feststellungen beginnen, um dann zu 
sehen, welchen Dienst sie fur das Verstdndnis 
des logischen Urteilsbe griff es leisten konnen" 
This is to say, you must start with certain ex- 
istential facts in order to obtain a basis for 
consideration of the judgment. Later, 7 he says 
that it is immaterial whether all judgments, psy- 
chologically speaking, contain either an affirma- 
tion or a negation, for the epistemological prob- 
lem concerns only those which do imply one. 
His developed theory, however, claims that all 
knowledge (true knowledge — even existential 
facts) contains an affirmation or a negation. 
What of the facts taken from psychology which 
he used to erect his theory? He has assumed 
the knowledge of certain facts in order to prove 
a theory of the dependence of reality on knowl- 
edge. It is an error of method. 

§ 2. The position of Rickert, in holding that 
existential facts imply judgments, is to the effect 
that there are immediate truths. We know 
existential truth with existence, and the latter 
cannot be regarded as independent of the for- 

7 Rickert, op. cit., 96. 



26 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

mer. Rickert is not alone in supposing that 
there are immediate truths. This theory is held 
by Russell 8 and by James, among moderns. In 
the case of James, however, perhaps it is more 
a question of terminology, as knowledge, in his 
use of the word, is not restricted to propositions. 

Dewey (in a conversation with the writer) 
has brought a cogent argument in criticism of 
this doctrine of immediate truths. In the prop- 
osition " It is green," a whole background of 
experience is presupposed, the comparison of 
colors. If the judgment is to be verified, the 
use of spectrum analysis will be required. The 
truth of the simplest " atomic " proposition, 
therefore, is dependent upon a great number of 
" molecular " propositions. " It is green " may 
be a " snap judgment," associating a particular 
phenomenon with others that I have experi- 
enced, or it may involve the services of an ex- 
pert physicist, as in a law court. In either case, 
truth is a matter of inference, and the process 
is no simple, compelling affirmation, but a har- 
monization with past experience by comparison. 

§ 3. If, therefore, truth always involves some 
kind of inference, there can be no such thing as 

8 Cf. Russell, Bertrand, Scientific Method in Philosophy, 52 ff. 



TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 2J 

an " immediate truth." But what shall we say 
of the affirmation or negation which we are 
"compelled" to give to existential judgments? 
It seems to me that Rickert has been misled by 
his polemic against the object of knowledge 
conceived as " independent " of the individual. 
He feels that, if this conception is abandoned, 
a substitute must be found, not so crude, but 
still independent. Thereupon he infers an in- 
dependent Sollen from our feeling of necessity 
in affirming existential judgments. My criti- 
cism here is that the question of what is the 
object of knowledge need not be introduced to 
account for the affirmation or negation that we 
feel compelled to make. We need postulate 
only a center of experience, a succession of 
phenomena, memory, and association. Affirma- 
tion or negation will then be accounted for on 
the basis of agreement or disagreement of the 
phenomena by comparison in memory. Truth 
will then be applicable to those judgments which 
state relations that have proved constant. From 
the epistemological standpoint, it is wholly naive 
to seek an object that compels us to recognize 
similarity. 

§ 4. Perhaps it may be urged that, in the 



28 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

preceding section, terms have been assumed 
wrongfully to be given before relations, and 
that we have no right to use terms to explain 
the judgment, inasmuch as terms themselves 
imply existential judgments. My answer to 
this objection is: How then does Rickert feel 
justified in speaking of an opposition between 
perceiving (Vorstellen) and a class comprised 
of judgments of affirmation and negation, Fuh- 
len, and Wollen? What are perceptions if not 
terms? And, if they are existential judgments, 
how may they be opposed to judgments? And 
how can Rickert say that, when there is only a 
succession of perceptions, truth cannot enter? 

My conclusion is that affirmation or negation 
must not be held to be of more than incidental 
importance where the truth of judgments is 
concerned, and that its psychological explana- 
tion is ultimate. 

§ 5. Rickert's correlation of Bejahen oder 
Verneinen with Billigen oder Missbilligen and 
Gef alien oder Missf alien is crude and super- 
ficial. Because there is an " either-or " in the 
case of Fuhlen and Wollen which distinguishes 
positive and negative immediate values, he con- 
cludes, without justification, that the " either- 



TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 29 

or " of affirmation or negation in Denken is 
similar in kind. It is undeniably true that, 
when we affirm or deny a proposition, the ele- 
ments of will and feeling are present in the 
act of affirming or denying. This is to say no 
more than that the fields of cognition, feeling, 
and activity are never isolated. It is quite 
another matter, however, to conclude that feel- 
ings determine knowledge. 9 The true correla- 
tion is, that, in connection with judgments and 
feelings and desires, there is a removal of some 
kind of opposition; but this is not to say that 
the determining factor is one of the elements, 
any more than another. It would be just as 
warrantable to say that cognition determines all 
feelings or all desires. No, there is opposition 
that is removed in Fuhlen, Denken, and Wollen, 
but the same factor does not operate in each of 
the three classes. One would have expected 
that Rickert would have hesitated to make 
Fuhlen responsible for Erkennen, in view of 
his recognition of the timeless 10 character of 
the " either-or " of affirmation and negation. 
It would seem that this timeless character 
should have made it evident to him that the 

9 Rickert, op. cit., 106. 10 Op. tit., 112. 



30 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

factor of interest X1 on the part of the individual 
is entirely incidental to the truth or falsity of 
judgments. It is psychological, not logical. 

To summarize the arguments, it may be said 
that truth is not an immediate value because: 

§ i. The theory rests on a false derivation 
of metaphysics from epistemology ; 

§ 2. Truth, even existential truth, is infer- 
ential ; 

§ 3. A transcendental Sollen is superfluous, 
and unwarranted by the " feeling of the neces- 
sity of judgment"; 

§ 4. The theory does not account for the 
existence of perceptions apart from judgment, 
though it presupposes them; 

§ 5. The theory of the dependence of truth 
on the interest of individuals is logically un- 
sound. 

11 Op. cit., 105. 



CHAPTER III 

THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES 
WITH RESPECT TO THEIR ORIGIN 

NOW that it has been demonstrated 
that truth is not an immediate value, 
the way is cleared for discussion of 
the interrelations of the two classes of values. 
I purpose following an order which might be 
called the " natural history of values." I shall 
endeavor successively to answer the questions, 
" Where do values begin in the development of 
conscious life?" "What is their progress in 
the course of evolution?" "What happens 
when we talk about them ? " and " How are 
the two classes related in our daily experi- 
ence? " The first part of my discussion, there- 
fore, will be biological and psychological, the 
second, epistemological, and the third, biological 
and psychological. 

Before proceeding with the first part of my 
task, it will be necessary to describe the stand- 
point from which discussion of the origin of 
values is possible. Then I shall describe a 
series of steps in the development of contribu- 
tory and immediate values from the earliest 

3i 



32 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

stages of conscious activity to the mature, re- 
flective consciousness of the educated man. 

§ i . It was stated in the first chapter 1 that 
knowledge of an immediate value is not neces- 
sary to its existence. This thesis bears two 
interpretations, both of which are true and 
applicable. It may mean : When I like a thing, 
I don't have to think or speak of it as a value. 
It may also mean: The feeling I have toward 
an object that I like is quite distinct from my 
knowledge of that feeling. Now these two 
interpretations of the independence of immedi- 
ate value of knowledge thus express the truths 
that (a) the immediate value is independent of 
the judgment, and (b) the immediate value is 
independent of its being thought. More ex- 
plicitly, the latter proposition means that my 
actual liking for grapes is different in kind 
from my thought about that actual liking. 

We may also argue that contributory values 
may exist apart from the judgment. Objects 
may be valued as means without judging them 
to be such. A man may find a branch useful 
for raising a stone. We may suppose him to 
be so accustomed to raising stones with branches 

1 Page io. 



WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 33 

that he gives no thought to the means which he 
employs. He simply picks up a stick and uses 
it as a lever. Such actions, in which we utilize 
past experience habitually without the medium 
of judgment, are of every-day occurrence. We 
may even use means instinctively, without ever 
having made judgment. The baby who searches 
for its mother's breast with hands and mouth 
is employing the latter as means without under- 
standing them to be such. Birds search in- 
stinctively for materials out of which to build 
their nests. The judgment evidently represents 
a very high level in the development of con- 
tributory values. 

§ 2. In seeking for a standpoint from which 
to discuss the origin and development of values, 
it is evident that we must go back of the judg- 
ment. It is evident that values of both classes 
may be present in consciousness without the 
presence of judgment. There is a difficulty, 
however, that confronts us when we come to 
discuss the development of values from the 
earliest stage of consciousness. It is not an 
epistemological difficulty, but rather a difficulty 
of standpoint. 

In discussing value, it is quite possible to 



34 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

confine oneself to the standpoint of the one 
who values. We may consider how much a 
man likes or dislikes something, or the value 
which he places on certain things, or the use- 
fulness of certain articles to him in accomplish- 
ing what he aims to accomplish. 

On the other hand, it is quite possible to take 
the standpoint of the spectator or observer, from 
the vantage-ground of the high plane of judg- 
ment. Then we may point out that certain 
things or actions were valuable to the man, 
were to his advantage. He may quite accident- 
ally have engaged room and board at a house 
where one who was to become his lifelong friend 
was staying. We may say that his coming to 
that house was a valuable action on his part, 
in view of the good fortune that came to him 
later from the friendship. We may say that 
the value which contributed most to Henry's 
success was his up-bringing in a home of cul- 
ture. In these cases, the values of which we 
speak are means to definite ends, but they are 
means to ends of which the observer, not the 
agent, is thinking. From the standpoint of the 
agent, they are simply causes leading to effects. 
This is indeed the difference between a con- 



WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 35 

tributory value and a cause: to be of contribu- 
tory value, the element of interest must be 
added. And this interest may be that of the 
agent or of the spectator. 

If it appear that the distinction just drawn is 
confined to contributory value, observe also that 
immediate value was seen to be independent of 
its being thought. 2 I very much doubt whether 
any one will claim that the feelings of a man 
when he was a baby and could not understand 
them, were more than mechanical. One would 
hardly say that they were the same in signifi- 
cance as the likes and dislikes of later years. 
And yet, from our standpoint, we can look down 
and say that the infantile pleasures and pains 
were exhibitions of felt goods as much as the 
likes and dislikes of later life. We are again 
confronted with the distinction between the 
standpoints of the agent and the observer. 

What point of view are we to adopt in the 
discussion of the origin and development of 
values? That of the observer, surely, for our 
subject in this aspect reaches back long before 
ideation reached perfection. And yet we must 
bear the distinction in mind, for we shall dis- 

2 Page 32. 



36 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

cover that two equally reasonable interpreta- 
tions of certain situations are made harmonious 
only by being shown to proceed from two differ- 
ent points of view. This preliminary word on' 
standpoint, therefore, is in the nature of a cau- 
tion and a warning. 

§ 3. It is quite obvious that the meaning of 
the earliest stage of consciousness in terms of 
value can be discussed only from the standpoint 
of the observer. There could be neither a felt 
good nor an instrument directed toward an end, 
where no consciousness was present. What do 
we mean when we speak of a value in connec- 
tion with the appearance of the earliest stage of 
consciousness? We cannot mean a felt good, 
for our whole process of observation is bound 
up with judgment on our part. We can only 
mean that the appearance of the earliest stage 
of consciousness was valuable to an end which 
we have in view, viz., the development of con- 
scious life. It may be said, therefore, that, 
from the observer's standpoint, the earliest 
stage of consciousness, whatever may have been 
the nature of its elements, was of contributory 
value to the developing organism. 

§ 4. This is not the place to frame a general 



WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 37 

theory of the origin of consciousness. It is 
necessary, however, that we examine the origin 
of the earliest stage to such an extent that we 
may learn what element there is in it to cause 
us to ascribe value to the stage. Perhaps it 
may be said that it is sufficient that conscious- 
ness led to the creation of value on the part of 
the individual himself, and this is a true answer. 
But we may inquire further: what are the con- 
ditions of the earliest stage of consciousness 
which cause us to recognize it as a means to 
the appearance of value in the individual him- 
self? Perhaps there are general conditions ap- 
pearing which are biological concomitants of all 
values. Unless some such thing be found to be 
true, we might say that all evolution in the 
organic world was of contributory value with 
respect to the development of conscious life, 
and value would thereby be indistinguishable 
from causation viewed anthropocentrically. It 
is, of course, permissible for the spectator to 
look at the whole universe from the standpoint 
of man; an individual human being may even 
consider all past progress in every sphere of 
development as focussed on the great event of 
his appearance in the world. But such a way 



38 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

of thinking would be regarded justly as one- 
sided, in view of the existence of so many other 
human standpoints. And so we must look upon 
man as man, and life as life, and not commit 
ourselves to an evaluation of the universe which 
will neglect the claims of other entities. 

If we are right, therefore, in ascribing con- 
tributory value to the earliest stage of conscious- 
ness, there must be some aspect of the causal 
elements of the situation which is of interest to 
the development of consciousness. The observer 
will here assume the standpoint of consciousness 
itself. He might say, " I am conscious activity. 
When the causal nexus brought me into being, 
what were the factors that were responsible for 
my appearance? I shall regard these as of con- 
tributory value to my very existence. ,, 

It should be observed that an earliest value 
of the kind that I have described will be, by its 
very nature, not an individual element of the 
causal chain, or even several individual elements ; 
it will rather be a certain situation that occurs 
in the course of evolution. This situation will 
not be identical with the sum of all the factors 
concerned in the event; it will rather be a selec- 
tion of those factors which characterize the 



WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 39 

complete situation as being conscious, not un- 
conscious. 

To recapitulate: we are seeking a situation 
which is marked by interest, as contrasted with 
previous situations which do not contain this. 
This situation will be the earliest contributory 
value from the standpoint of consciousness, as 
interpreted by a spectator. 

If we attempted to describe the whole situa- 
tion that marks the transition from the uncon- 
scious to the conscious, we should be trying to 
solve a problem which has baffled psychologists 
for centuries. This is not our task, let me 
repeat. We seek a minor situation, the point 
at which we spectators see interest to enter. 

Whatever may be the ultimate factors which 
distinguish the presence of life from its absence, 
it is certain that, in the lowest forms of life, 
we have a substance of highly complex chemical 
structure which is extremely sensitive to con- 
tact. This substance, protoplasm, is capable of 
reacting to a variety of stimuli. As long as 
the reactions are separate events, unrelated to 
previous reactions in more than a mechanical 
way, we cannot speak of value in connection 
with the process. It is when the living structure 



40 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

reacts to its environment in a round-about way, 
when some factor appears within the organism 
and overcomes an opposition, that we can first 
say that a contributory value is present. To 
illustrate, suppose a living, motile cell to be 
subject to a variety of stimuli. It swims about 
in a pool of water, drawn hither and thither by 
the influence of light, currents of water, tem- 
perature, perhaps color. If you could reckon 
all the stimuli and manipulate them, you could 
turn the cell into any direction of locomotion 
that you pleased. Now suppose there came a 
time when the cell responded in an unusual way 
to a stimulus. You know, however, by hypo- 
thesis, all of the possible stimuli from without 
the organism, and therefore can describe what 
has happened only by saying that some new 
factor has entered into the field and has neutral- 
ized or overcome the opposition of the stimulus 
which you projected. Here, I believe, we have 
the earliest stage of life in which we may speak 
of the presence of a value. 

Now it is very easy to say that no situation 
of this kind ever occurred. I think, however, 
that it will be possible to show that something 
like it must have occurred. Psychologists tell 



WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 41 

us that primitive conscious activity is marked 
by rudimentary elements of cognition, feeling, 
and will. They are not able to agree which of 
the three is the most primitive aspect, but some 
declare that all of them must be considered 
equally fundamental — the will-aspect, perhaps, 
being associated with activity in general. To 
have rudimentary aspects of cognition and feel- 
ing, however, it is necessary that at least two 
sensations be related internally, and that there 
be a difference felt between them. Now I main- 
tain that the situation in which this could have 
come about would contain a relation of organ- 
ism to environment in which an opposition was 
somehow circumvented by the organism. " Feel- 
ing the difference between two stimuli " would 
involve an independent action on the part of the 
organism. We know that life has developed so 
that living beings have become centers of con- 
scious activity. There must have been some 
point of transition. We may be sure that, what- 
ever the situation may have been in its entirety, 
it included the phenomenon of an opposition of 
the organism to an environmental stimulus which 
failed to work in the accustomed way. I must 
add, however, that no portion of this theory is 



42 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

intended to conflict in any way with a strict 
doctrine of determinism. It is not that the 
organism acts in an undetermined fashion, but 
that the determining factor is no longer in the 
environment, but in the organism itself. 

I may formulate the following conclusions as 
to the expression of the appearance of the earli- 
est stage of consciousness in terms of value: 

(a) The appearance of the earliest stage of 
consciousness is, from the standpoint of the 
observer, of contributory value with respect to 
the bringing about of the existence of value 
from the standpoint of the organism itself. 

(b) This is true because this earliest stage of 
consciousness gives birth to the initial require- 
ment of value from the standpoint of the organ- 
ism, namely, that there be a center of activity 
to serve as the basis of an interest that is di- 
rected outward, (c) The significant biological 
aspect is the presence of a situation where an 
opposition of some stimulus to a living organism 
is overcome by a factor that is the product of 
a process within the organism. 

Before I describe the origin of value from 
the standpoint of the individual himself, it may 
be well to keep the observer's point of view for 



WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 43 

a moment, in order to determine what kind of 
value must be ascribed to the later developments 
of conscious activity from the standpoint of the 
observer. It seems to me that there is an a priori 
answer to this question. All values from the 
standpoint of the observer are contributory. 
This is true (a) because they are estimated, 
judged values, and (b) because it would be 
absurd to speak of a good that was felt by an 
observer with respect to a process in nature. 
One doesn't feel the good of a rainstorm. He 
estimates its good with reference to the supply 
of water in rivers and wells, or the effect of it 
upon the crops. The immediate values of felt 
coolness, the sparkle of light on the globules, 
etc., have nothing to do with the process as 
process. 

The observer, therefore, in making a survey 
of the development of conscious activity in the 
individual from its lowest to its highest forms, 
will recognize as values those developments 
which tend toward the end of value from the 
standpoint of the individual himself. Instinct, 
intelligence, memory, ideation, sympathy, etc., 
all will be contributory, from the observer's 
standpoint. 



44 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

Now it must be evident that the observer's 
standpoint, although it is the necessary point of 
view of the critic and the basis of all discussion 
of every kind, is not very productive as a method 
for the consideration of value. We need to take 
the standpoint of the individual consciousness 
itself, in order to arrive at the relations between 
the two classes of value. Two ways of doing 
this are open: (a) We may become intro- 
spective and seek the relation of the goods that 
we feel to the goods that we find useful. This 
method was that which gave me the initial 
distinction between immediate and contributory 
values. (b) Although our discussion itself 
must remain contributory in character, we can, 
however, look at the development of conscious 
activity from the standpoint of the individual 
himself. We view the process as a whole, yes, 
but we consider how one particular element of 
the whole is related to the other elements of the 
situation. The center from which we direct 
our attention to surrounding factors is the cen- 
ter of conscious activity that has come into 
being with the appearance of a particular con- 
sciousness. The relations between this center 
of activity and its environment will be values 
if they contain the element of interest. 



WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 45 

The earliest stage of consciousness, as we 
have seen, contains a difference felt} and from 
the observer's standpoint the appearance of this 
stage is of contributory value. Can we speak 
of this earliest stage of consciousness in terms 
of value from the standpoint of the organism? 
Perhaps not at the very moment of appearance, 
for the felt difference has no relation to a pre- 
exist ent center of activity. But suppose the 
difference to take unto itself a new object of 
discrimination. Suppose that there is now pres- 
ent, in the most elementary form of perception, 
recognition of three differents which constitute 
a little environment. Suppose, as we must, the 
presence of rudimentary feeling. It seems to 
me that, from this very earliest moment when 
the individual merits the title of individual, 
there is a situation which may be described in 
terms of value from the individual's own stand- 
point. There is a center of activity; the com- 
parison between the elementary perceptions is 
contributory toward future actions from that 
center; they are, therefore, contributory values. 

§ 5. What of the feeling-aspect? From the 
observer's standpoint, these elements are of con- 
tributory value. Feelings of pleasure and pain, 



46 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

however primitive, would act as warnings or as 
encouragement to the organism to desist from 
or persist in certain activities, just as percep- 
tion of " differents," the original end of feel- 
ings, is to help the organism get on with his 
environment. In this respect, the standpoints 
of the individual himself and of the observer 
are in agreement. But the fact that in con- 
scious activity every cognitive element has its 
accompanying feeling-tone or feeling-attitude 
gives a different color to the standpoint of the 
individual. The sensation which I get by touch- 
ing a hot stove is accompanied by a feeling of 
pain; but the idea of the stove which I retain is 
accompanied by a feeling-attitude which is more 
complex than the pain which I experienced, for 
the reason that the idea of the stove is some- 
thing more than hot-object. The various sen- 
sations which serve as the basis of my idea of 
the stove enter into a process of comparison 
with the ideas of past sensations. The feeling- 
attitude toward the idea of stove, therefore, is 
not a feeling accompanying a " simple sensa- 
tion," but one accompanying an idea that is 
full of inferential import from past experience. 
Stated in a proposition, this observation would 



WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 47 

read: The feeling-attitude which accompanies 
an idea is different from the feeling which 
accompanies a simple sensation. 

§ 6. How can this distinction best be ex- 
pressed? Feelings are feelings, and the differ- 
ence to which I refer can hardly be a psycho- 
logical difference. I believe that it can best be 
made in terms of value. We may say that the 
feeling which accompanies a simple sensation is 
of contributory value to the individual (from 
the standpoints of both individual and observer), 
but that the feeling toward the idea is of imme- 
diate value. In other words, when the cognitive 
process, by comparison and memory, develops 
ideas, there arise accompanying feelings which 
have exceeded the function of feelings which 
accompany sensations. The latter were con- 
tributory to the welfare of the individual; the 
former comprise the feeling-side of the indi- 
vidual's relation to his environment. From his 
conscious activity as a center, cognitive and 
feeling elements together are relating that cen- 
ter to surrounding reality; his environment 
grows like the concentric circles of ripples which 
move outward from the place where a stone has 
struck the water. 



48 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

I have formulated this theory with reference 
to a mature conscious activity. The method 
of introspection facilitated the problem. Now, 
however, we may apply the theory to early con- 
scious activity which cannot be examined by 
introspection. In this connection we shall find 
it equally satisfying. 

§ 7. The feeling element which is associated 
with the cognitive element in the very earliest 
appearance of consciousness is wholly contribu- 
tory from the standpoints of both observer and 
organism. The feeling elements that accom- 
pany the various cognitive elements as they 
arise, are likewise contributory, at the moment 
of their origin. But the comparisons Eetween 
cognitive elements that are recorded in a rudi- 
mentary memory are accompanied by feelings 
which, though contributory from the observer's 
point of view, are the psychological basis of a 
new kind of value, immediate in character. We 
might, therefore, speak of contributory values 
as the stuff out of which immediate values arise. 

A corollary of this theory of immediate value 
must not be neglected. It follows that, in the 
case of a mature consciousness, one must dis- 
tinguish between feelings that arise unaccom- 



WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 49 

panied by reflection, and those which have been 
influenced by the cognitive processes. For ex- 
ample, I must distinguish between the feeling 
of pain that comes to me when I touch a hot 
stove in the dark and the dislike for that feel- 
ing which almost instantaneously follows. The 
former feeling is of contributory value to me in 
prompting me to remove my hand; the latter 
marks my attitude toward my experience, and 
is an immediate value. It may be objected: 
Did you not say, however, that my liking for 
grapes must be distinguished from my thought 
about that liking, the actual liking being imme- 
diate, and the thought contributory ? Certainly, 
and it must not be supposed that, by a feeling- 
attitude which accompanies reflection, I mean 
the reflection itself. The distinction here is 
wholly within feeling. In the example of grapes, 
my liking for grapes as an immediate value is 
to be distinguished from the primitive feeling 
accompanying the sensation that I receive when 
I first put a grape into my mouth. 

§ 8. It is not my purpose in this chapter to 
go beyond a discussion of the interrelation of 
values with respect to their origin. From the 
consideration of their origin, however, it is 



50 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

possible to point out two divergent directions in 
the development of conscious activity. One of 
these starts with the comparison of cognitive 
elements in the primitive organism and develops 
through memory, ideation, intelligence, intellec- 
tion, judgment, etc., to knowledge, the highest 
point of contributory value. The other direc- 
tion of development is toward a growth of the 
individual's environment by the accumulation of 
feeling-attitudes which accompany the various 
cognitive elements. These two functions in 
conscious activity are never separated in any 
action, but they are nevertheless always distinct 
in character. And although feeling is never 
present without cognition, it is not necessary 
that a feeling-attitude which is recalled by the 
recognition of an object be accompanied by the 
same cognitive elements that were the original 
cause of the attitude. My attitude of liking or 
dislike toward a man may have followed in the 
first instance a complicated process of judgment 
in which I sized him up in various ways — his 
disposition, the color of his hair, etc. When I 
see the man again, the perception of him recalls 
my attitude, which is the same as it was before, 
although the elements which enter into my per- 
ception have been vastly simplified. 



WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 51 

I believe that the two branches of conscious 
activity which I have described embody a more 
fundamental distinction than that made by Berg- 
son between instinct and intelligence. Bergson 
distinguishes instinct and intelligence as being 
two modes of life's action on the material world, 
" directly, by creating an organised instrument 
to work with; or else it [life] can effect it in- 
directly through an organism which, instead of 
possessing the required instrument naturally, 
will itself construct it by fashioning inorganic 
matter. ,, 3 According to Bergson, intelligence 
is characterized by its ability to make tools 
out of artificial objects; it would therefore be 
contributory. But instinct may also construct 
tools, 4 so that it must also be counted as con- 
tributory. Later, however, Bergson 5 identifies 
instinct with sympathy. It seems to me that 
tool-constructing (even out of organic matter 
only) and the feeling-attitude of sympathy are 
too different ever to be united in one term. I 
therefore believe that the distinction between 
instinct and intelligence as expounded by Berg- 
son cannot be fundamental. 

3 Bergson, Henri, Creative Evolution, trans. Mitchell, 142. 

4 Op. cit., 140. s Op. cit., 176. 



52 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

The results of the discussion contained in this 
chapter may be summarized as follows: 

§ i. Neither contributory nor immediate val- 
ues require the presence of judgment for their 
existence. 

§ 2. There are two possible standpoints from 
which values may be discussed, that of the ob- 
server and that of the organism which values. 

§ 3. From the observer's standpoint, the ap- 
pearance of consciousness and all the elements 
of consciousness are contributory in value, both 
as to their origin and as to their persistence. 

§ 4. The biological beginnings of value lie 
in this: that some stimuli are dangerous for an 
organism, and the organism overcomes them by 
a process originating within itself. 

§ 5. Feeling is contributory in origin, but 
the feeling-attitudes which accompany ideas 
rather than simple sensations are immediate, 
from the standpoint of the individual. 

§ 6. Cognition and feeling relate the indi- 
vidual to his environment in ways that are never 
isolated, but which always remain distinct in 
character. 

§ 7. Contributory values are the stuff out of 
which immediate values arise. 



WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 53 

§ 8. The two divergent directions of the 
development of conscious activity, which have 
been described as leading to the experiencing of 
contributory and immediate values respectively, 
are more fundamentally distinct than Bergson's 
division into instinct and intelligence. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES 
WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 

THE subject-matter of this chapter falls 
into two divisions. As in the discus- 
sion of the origin of values, there are 
here also two possible standpoints which may be 
taken. As observer, I may look over the course 
of evolution and observe judgment in the act 
itself; I may view the circumstances which gave 
rise to judgment; and I may view the content 
of judgment in its relation to the development 
of value in the individual. Or, from the stand- 
point of the individual himself, I may ask what 
values were first expressed in language by the 
individual, how the conception of value came to 
develop in the consciousness of the individual, 
and to what limit the process of evaluation may 
be carried. 

It must be remembered, although it need not 
lead to confusion, that the field of the second 
division proposed for discussion is less inclusive 
than the first. From the observer's standpoint, 
I consider all types of judgment, not alone those 
judgments which state values. Judgment is here 

54 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 55 

regarded in its aspect as the climax of develop- 
ment of the cognitive function. Judgments in 
general, therefore, will be contributory, accord- 
ing to the rule that all the elements of conscious 
activity, from the standpoint of the observer, 
are contributory both as to their origin and 
as to their persistence. 1 From the individual's 
standpoint, however, our attention is restricted 
to those cases of judgment which bring to ex- 
pression immediate or contributory values. 

At one point, it must be said, the standpoints 
of the observer and the individual may almost 
merge. Such a phenomenon was not possible 
in the case of the origin of values, because there 
had not developed a process of conscious reflec- 
tion. In the case of the judgment, however, it 
is possible for the individual to look back on the 
act of judgment and verify the result of the act. 
So that, in discussing the content of the judg- 
ment, it is immaterial whether we observers 
anticipate the individual in his verification or 
let him do it himself. In this case, therefore, 
the distinction between the two standpoints, 
while present, is immaterial to the discussion. 
For convenience I have placed this section of 

1 Page 43, §3. 



56 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

the argument under the same heading as that 
of the act of judgment, because judgments in 
general are treated of in both sections. 

I may, then, divide the discussion as follows: 
I. Judgments as values (Standpoint of the 
observer: A. Acts of judgment as values; 
B. Content of judgments as values (Stand- 
points merge). II. Judgments of values (Stand- 
point of the individual). 

I. JUDGMENTS AS VALUES 
In discussing judgments as values, it is neces- 
sary to distinguish between the act of judging 
and the content of the judgment. An act of 
judging is called forth in obedience to stimuli 
in a particular set of circumstances. The pres- 
ence or absence of value in the act itself must 
be judged with reference to these particular 
circumstances and not to any later usefulness 
of the judgment. The value of any judgment, 
however, may also be determined with reference 
to its subsequent effect upon the activity of the 
individual — whether it is found to be service- 
able as a guide for future action. Value in this 
instance is determined with respect to its con- 
tent. Each of these cases will be discussed in 
turn. 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 57 

A. Acts of Judgment as Values 
§ 1. The act of judgment has been contrasted 
with the content of the judgment. This lan- 
guage, though convenient, is inaccurate, for it 
is evident that in considering the act of judg- 
ment we are considering the judgment, and that 
the judgment without content would not be a 
judgment. What I mean, therefore, is rather 
that here the act of judgment is discussed with 
its content, but with reference only to the par- 
ticular stimuli which call it forth. For example, 
if I discuss the judgment " It is a fine day " 
with reference to the act, I discuss its meaning 
with regard to the circumstances which caused 
me to make it, not with reference to the thunder- 
storm which came up during the afternoon. 
Just as the act of judgment can be approached 
only from the standpoint of the observer, so is 
the discussion of the content as caused only to 
be carried out from that standpoint. 

§ 2. Since from the standpoint of the ob- 
server all values are contributory, 2 the question 
is not as to what kind of values acts of judg- 
ment are, but whether acts of judgment are 
values at all. The answer seems to follow di- 

2 Page 43. 



58 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

rectly from a point made in a preceding chap- 
ter, 3 that, from the standpoint of the observer, 
values comprise whatever tends to the develop- 
ment of value from the standpoint of the indi- 
vidual himself. Under such a category are 
included all the developments of the cognitive 
function of conscious activity. For this reason 
I maintain that all acts of judgment are con- 
tributory. 

(a) But there may be some doubt expressed 
as to whether certain cases of acts of judgment 
may be deemed contributory. What of acts of 
existential judgment, false judgment, and theo- 
retical (vs. " useful ") judgment? These dis- 
tinctions are made from the standpoint of the 
observer with reference to the content, however, 
and, according to the rule just laid down, the 
content must be considered here only with ref- 
erence to the time of the act and the circum- 
stances which caused the act. In such a light, 
it will be seen that no matter what the content 
may be, the act of judgment must, like every 
other act, be a caused act. Furthermore, it is 
a caused act within the cognitive field of con- 
sciousness ; that is, the causal process takes place 

3 Page 43. 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 59 

within the organism itself. Therefore the act 
of judgment, whatever be the content, always 
adds to the functioning of conscious activity, 
and, since whatever adds to the development 
of interest around a center of activity directed 
outward is contributory, 4 all acts of judgment 
are contributory. 

B. Content of Judgments as Values 
It was comparatively easy to maintain that 
acts of judgment are contributory. One had 
merely to view the evolutionary process and 
see a series of caused actions directed outward 
from a center of activity called consciousness. 
Every element of this process is seen to be con- 
tributory to its smooth working; every act is 
the overcoming of obstacles that impede further 
action. 

When, however, we come to the consideration 
of the content of the judgment with reference 
to future action based on it, the case is more 
difficult. It may appear that certain acts of 
judgment, useful at the time of judging as steps 
in the active process, are valuable only as acts, 
later losing their value. Judgment is different 

4 Pages 44-45. 



60 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

from lower forms of cognition in that it may 
be preserved in memory and expressed by an 
artificial medium. (Of course, the terms of 
judgment may also be remembered and ex- 
pressed. " Ideation " would be more accurate 
than "judgment," here.) The question of the 
permanence of the content as value arises. 
When is the content valuable as well as the 
act? The test is the future usefulness of the 
content. 

The individual himself has now arrived at 
the high plane of judgment. 5 He may there- 
fore discuss the matter himself, or we observers 
may do it for him; the two standpoints will not 
differ in their result. 

I shall endeavor to substantiate the following 
thesis : 

The content of judgments is contributory 
when the judgments are true, and may be con- 
tributory when the judgments are false but 
when the terms of the judgments are signs of 
real entities. 

The question of truth or falsity was imma- 
terial when consideration of the judgment was 
restricted to the act, and its content to the 

5 Cf. page 55. 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 61 

particular circumstances which called it forth. 
But when the value of the judgment is consid- 
ered with reference to future actions on the part 
of the individual, the question of truth or falsity 
becomes important. If I find, when I come to 
verify a judgment, that I have been wrong, the 
content of that judgment will not be as useful 
to me as it would have been, had I been right 
in my judging. " It will not rain " may serve 
to overcome my hesitation as to whether I shall 
take an umbrella, but, if it does rain, I shall not 
keep dry. 

(i) True Judgments Are Contributory as to 
Content 

§ 3. We have already ascertained that acts 
of judgment are contributory. Truth, however, 
is a term which does not apply to judgment in 
the act. At what point, therefore, it may be 
asked, does the term " truth " become appli- 
cable ? 

Of course the answer depends upon one's 
theory of the judgment. I can only state my 
position as a basis for discussion. I hold that 
truth is the expression in the judgment of real 
relations. A true judgment is one that ex- 



62 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

presses a relation between real terms. It is 
evident that two requirements must be fulfilled 
if a judgment is to be true: the terms must be 
signs of real entities, and the relation between 
the terms must be a real relation. 

§ 4. Now this criterion of truth is an ex- 
tremely hard one. It may take a judgment a 
long time to become verified; one may never be 
quite certain about the truth of some particular 
judgment. On the other hand, some judgments 
require no verification at all. When I formu- 
late a definition, I state the equality of two 
signs, and no special proof or verification is 
necessary, because the terms are signs invented 
for the same entity. Such a definition would 
be a mathematical definition of a circle, a line, 
etc. It may easily happen, however, that the 
explanatory term of the definition will require 
some measure of verification. We speak of 
" good definitions " and " poor definitions," ac- 
cording as the explanatory term marks off accu- 
rately a special portion of reality. Thus, if I 
define a horse to be a four-legged animal or a 
white quadruped, I shall not form a good defi- 
nition, because the explanatory term will be 
either too inclusive or too exclusive. No one 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 63 

would deny the truth of the proposition " The 
horse is a four-legged animal " ; but every one 
would say that the proposition " The horse is a 
white quadruped " is false. The former judg- 
ment relates terms that are signs of real entities, 
but the latter judgment relates terms between 
which there is no equality as respects the por- 
tions of reality for which they stand. One 
judgment is true, the other false; and yet they 
are both poor definitions. 

There is apparently some confusion here. 
" Poor definition " means one that is not valu- 
able, or as valuable as it might be. But both 
true and false definitions, as we see, may be 
poor. It is obvious, then, that the criteria of 
truth and value are not the same. The criterion 
of truth has been mentioned. It is now neces- 
sary to discuss the relation of truth to value, 
and to do so, we must discover where the two 
criteria differ. 

§ 5. The thesis which I laid down was, 
: True judgments are contributory.' ' This 
proposition is the pragmatists' " Truth is use- 
ful." It by no means follows that " All con- 
tributory judgments are true" (the converse). 
In order to make clear the distinction, it will be 



64 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

necessary to discuss the end to which judgments 
are contributory or useful. 

Truth itself has no need of an end; it is 
simply the expression in judgment of real rela- 
tions. Some authors have attempted to infer 
that truth is an end-in-itself, a given value. 
This, however, is illicit. I may indeed make 
truth an end, and it will thereby become a given 
good, an immediate value; but, according to the 
common realistic definition to which I adhere, 
truth is something apart from the interest of 
any individual. It does not arise from within 
the organism; it is rather the effect in con- 
sciousness of what is brute and obstinate in 
reality. The individual consciousness is not 
forced to become interested in any part of real- 
ity except that with which it comes into contact. 
It may find the truth ; it may not ; but it is forced 
in any case to attach value to its environment. 

Truth, therefore, represents the accurate re- 
lation of portions of reality in the judgment, 
while value represents the relation of portions 
of reality to my interest. And what is the 
nature of this interest? It is that of conscious 
activity directed toward an end whose character 
is disclosed in the evolutionary process itself: 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 65 

conscious activity tends to describe and inter- 
pret reality in terms of itself; the individual by 
nature is ego-centric from his instinct of self- 
preservation to his most altruistic impulses. 
Note that ego-centric does not mean selfish; it 
means rather that the individual of matured 
conscious activity feels a sympathy toward, 
feels drawn toward the whole universe, that 
interest from the individual center of conscious 
activity tends to direct itself outward as far as 
possible. Such is the nature of the end to 
which contributory values are useful. 

§ 6. It will be apparent, therefore, that, 
while truth in itself is no value at all, true 
judgments, proceeding from an individual, will 
always be contributory to putting him into touch 
with the reality which opposes him and which 
he must conquer by interpretation. But not 
only does it not follow that all contributory 
judgments are true, but it also does not follow 
that all true judgments are of the greatest, or 
of equal contributory value. There are degrees 
of contributory value, but there are no degrees 
of truth. One truth is just as true as another, 
but it may be of much less contributory value. 
The existential judgment, for instance, is true 



66 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

and contributes to my taking stock of brute 
reality, so to speak; but the judgment "Fire 
exists " is not so contributory as " Fire burns " 
— yet both are equally true. 

(2) False Judgments May Be Contributory 
When Their Terms Are Signs of Real 
Entities 

To prove this portion of my thesis, it will be 
necessary to revert for a moment to discussion 
of the act of judgment. I shall ask, " What 
characterizes an act of judgment?" 

§ 7. Acts of judgment were proved to be 
contributory. 6 My proof assumed that, in the 
case of every act of judgment, there is always 
present in consciousness a causal situation of 
which the act is the result. We may accord- 
ingly find cases of apparent judgment where 
there are no acts of judgment, properly so- 
called. A parrot may be taught to say, " This 
is just as good!" but he will not perform an 
act of judgment, because conscious interest is 
lacking. The schoolboy may write on his slate 
" The sun shines " a hundred times, and there 
probably is only one act of judgment, made in 

• Page 58. 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 67 

connection with the first writing. A proposi- 
tion, done in writing, and buried in the Sahara 
desert, forgotten absolutely {pro argument 0) 
by its author, and never again seen by man, is 
not an act of judgment. In none of these cases 
is a value present, because the conscious situa- 
tion is lacking. To be contributory, judgment 
must be associated with interest, and this inter- 
est may be either from the standpoint of the 
observer in the act itself, or in an act of re-cog- 
nition on the part of the individual. 

§ 8. It was easy to show that acts of false 
judgment are contributory from the standpoint 
of the observer, as well as acts of true judg- 
ment. It is now questioned whether the con- 
tent of the false judgment remains contributory 
after the act, with reference to further action 
on the part of the individual. 

From the preceding discussion it is apparent 
that our consideration assumes that the false 
judgment is related to future action on the part 
of the individual — otherwise the element of 
interest would disappear. Providing that its 
terms have reference to portions of reality, the 
situation of the false judgment is that the indi- 
vidual has stated a relation between signs of 



68 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

real entities which does not hold in reality. Now 
the end to which judgments are contributory, as 
we have found, is the relation of reality to a 
center of conscious activity. By the false judg- 
ment, the individual has related portions of real- 
ity in terms of consciousness, but he has related 
them falsely. 

Ideation is contributory, along with the other 
developments of the cognitive function. There- 
fore, the terms of the false judgment are con- 
tributory, because they relate portions of reality 
to a center of conscious activity. It is asked 
whether the incorrect relation of these terms 
may ever be contributory. 

My answer is, " Yes ! " The individual thinks, 
believes that the false judgment is true (falsity 
is, therefore, from the standpoint of the observer, 
here also). He acts on this judgment as if it 
were true. Later he may discover that it was 
false ; he may never discover its falsity. Which- 
ever happens, the false judgment will serve, in 
all probability, as a basis of future action. We 
make mistakes in our judgment, but learn by 
experience. It would be very satisfying if we 
always judged correctly, but it would be ghastly 
if we never judged except when we were sure 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 69 

that we were judging truly. To behave in such 
an impossible manner would necessitate our ac- 
cepting the judgments of one in whom we had 
as great faith as we have in our perceptions. 
Independent judgment would be denied to us. 
We could never make our own verifications. 
If we never made mistakes, we never should 
have certainty of anything. 

§ 9. It is conceivable, however, that a false 
judgment may sometimes have the opposite 
effect of blocking future activity along the par- 
ticular lines of its terms. An example of such 
a judgment would be an obstinate prejudice. 
An obstinate prejudice implies a refusal by act 
of will to proceed in verification. Such a preju- 
dice could not be called contributory (unless we 
were to speak of it as a negative value, con- 
tributory to the end of imbecility). Mistakes, 
therefore, no more than true judgments, are 
ends in themselves; but both are, or may be, 
contributory to the biological end of value. 

(3) Measurement of the Degree to Which a 
Judgment is Contributory 
§ 10. It was stated in § 6 7 that, although 
there are no degrees of truth, there are degrees 

7 Page 65. 



70 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

of value. In the present connection, it will be 
interesting to inquire whether there is some way 
of measuring the degree to which a judgment 
is contributory. This investigation, needless to 
say, is quite independent of that as to what de- 
grees of value the individual himself fixes in 
judgment. The latter investigation belongs to 
the section treating of judgments of values. 
The present question is most conveniently 
thought of as from the standpoint of the ob- 
server, although there would be nothing to pre- 
vent the individual himself from answering it. 
Indeed, if he wishes to coordinate his aims in 
life, he will think very seriously of this matter, 
and try to make his judgments of values har- 
monize with the degree to which his judgments 
are values. That is, he will try not to attribute 
greater or less value to anything in judgment, 
than the judgment actually is worth, when con- 
sidered with reference to the whole career of 
the cognitive function. But, as I have before 
remarked, attributing value in judgments is only 
a small part of judging in general; and consid- 
eration of the degree to which judgments are 
valuable is a larger and more inclusive subject 
than that of the degree to which value- judg- 
ments are valuable. 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 71 

A common-sense answer to our question would 
be that the degree to which a contributory judg- 
ment is contributory is the extent to which it 
possesses " practicality/ ' But, as " practical- 
ity " is a general term including a number of 
elements, it will be worth while to analyze it. 

There appear to me to be at least three con- 
siderations involved in practicality, (a) To 
be contributory, a judgment must be concerned 
with reality, both in its terms and usually in the 
relation expressed between the terms. Near- 
ness, or readiness of reference, to " brute " 
reality is a prominent feature here. If a term 
is too far away from the portion of reality of 
which it is a sign, it may easily have lost sharp- 
ness of distinction; its flavor may be gone. This 
is the reason why abstruse subjects are often 
best discussed with the use of words that are 
metaphorical, but very near to familiar objects. 
The effectiveness and permanent application of 
teaching by allegory is thus explained. If very 
theoretical terms are employed, their value will 
often be proportionate to the readiness with 
which they may be referred back to portions of 
reality. Thus, a formula of mechanics may be 
highly technical, but may be extremely valuable 
6 



72 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

because of the ease with which it may be applied 
to reality, (b) Another factor which enters 
into the degree to which judgments of con- 
tributory values are contributory is their rela- 
tion to the special environment of the individual. 
A judgment may be very useful to a physician, 
but comparatively useless to an artisan. The 
biological end to which judgments are contribu- 
tory is the same for all men, but the field of 
judgment is so immense that different indi- 
viduals must work from different centers in 
the field, and no man can hope to attain all 
knowledge. Thus the practicality of a judg- 
ment will also be measured with reference to 
its possible application to the individual's line 
of activity, (c) What applies to the single 
individual here applies also to the human race. 
Humanity has an environment distinct from 
that of insects or birds, and the degrees of 
contributory value may well be distinguished by 
considering the degrees to which needs are 
common to mankind. It must not be inferred, 
however, that we have knowledge of any judg- 
ments that do not affect human environment. 
Such a possibility is excluded by the result of 
our study of the origin of value in conscious- 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 73 

ness. I mean merely that certain judgments 
will be found to be more, or less, contributory 
to mankind, according as they overcome the 
oppositions common to the race rather than to 
a special class of men. 

§ 11. Finally, it may be objected that it is 
possible, by manipulation of terms, to arrive at 
judgments which have no contributory function 
at all. I may speak of these as theoretical judg- 
ments. This class of judgments will not include 
those judgments which may be referred by a 
round-about way to reality, or to those which 
might have a possible application at some future 
time, but only to those which, for the sake of 
argument, are purely speculative and unreal. 
If there are any such judgments, their existence 
is still not a good argument against my theory 
of values. For, together with my general ac- 
ceptance of realism, I hold that judgments are 
additive to reality; i.e., they are portions of 
reality itself, insofar as they are preserved in 
memory. The extent to which such judgments 
are contributory will be the degree to which the 
individual is interested in the imaginary terms. 

Division I of this chapter may be summarized 
as follows: 



74 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

I. Judgments as Values (Standpoint of the 
Observer). 

A. Acts of Judgment as Values. 

§ i. More accurately, the act of judgment is 
here discussed with its content, but only with 
reference to the particular stimuli which call it 
forth. 

§ 2. Acts of judgment are a development of 
the cognitive function of consciousness. All 
such developments are contributory values. 
Therefore, acts of judgment are contributory 
values. 

(a) Whatever be the character of the con- 
tent, an act of judgment is a caused act in the 
sphere of conscious activity; hence it is of con- 
tributory value. 

B. Content of Judgments as Values. 

This topic deals with the future usefulness 
of the content. 

(i) True judgments are contributory as to 
content. 

§ 3. For a judgment to be true, its terms 
must be signs of real entities, and the relation 
between the terms must be a real relation. 

§ 4. This criterion of truth is not the cri- 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 75 

terion of value, as is shown by the illustration 
that a true and a false definition may be equally 
" poor." 

§ 5. Truth has no end; value has a bio- 
logical end. 

§ 6. True judgments, however, are values 
because they contribute to the biological end of 
value. 

(2) False judgments may be contributory 
when their terms are signs of real entities. 

§ 7. To be valuable, a judgment must involve 
interest. 

§ 8. The terms of false judgments, when 
they are signs of real entities, are contributory. 
The false relation is contributory if the indi- 
vidual uses it as the basis of future action; 
i.e., if it retains the individual's interest. 

§ 9. Some false judgments may stifle inter- 
est in both terms and relation. These might be 
considered to be of negative value. 

(3) Measurement of the degree to which a 
judgment is contributory. 

§ 10. The degree to which the content of a 
judgment is contributory is the degree of its 
nearness or readiness of reference to reality, 



76 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

its nearness to the special environment of the 
judging individual, and its universality of ap- 
plication to mankind. 

§ ii. The content of purely theoretical or 
imaginary judgments is contributory in propor- 
tion to the interest of the individual in the theo- 
retical terms. 

II. JUDGMENTS OF VALUES 

We now come to the discussion of judgments 
of values by the individual. Let us gain a clear 
conception of the subject-matter of this division. 
It is quite obvious that an individual may make 
judgments without expressing values from his 
own standpoint. He cannot make a judgment, 
of course, without expressing a value consid- 
ered from the observers standpoint. 8 But he 
may make judgments that involve interest to 
him personally, and yet not think of his interest. 
The judgments by which a man expresses his 
needs and his wants, and declares what is con- 
tributory to the satisfaction of those needs and 
wants, form but a small proportion of his daily 
speech and thoughts. The confusion that is 
rife in this branch of the subject is largely due 

8 §§2-9. 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 77 

to the habit of some of mingling the standpoints 
of the observer and the individual. It is also 
due to the practice of certain writers of con- 
sidering truth as a " value-judgment." Having 
refuted this theory in a preceding chapter, 9 we 
shall do well to keep in mind the fact that, in 
the present case, we are dealing with only a 
very limited class of judgments. 

Our present investigation is parallel, in a way, 
with that of the origin of contributory and im- 
mediate values. There 10 a situation was sought 
where immediate and contributory values first 
emerged in consciousness. Here we seek a sit- 
uation where values first become expressed in 
the judgment, where the individual first ex- 
presses his own interest. The former investi- 
gation was entirely from the standpoint of the 
observer; the latter will be from that of the 
individual himself. 

In the discussion of the interrelation of values 
with respect to their origin, the data considered 
were biological. In the present investigation 
one might consider facts connected with the 
development of speech observed in savage tribes 

9 Chapter II. 
i° Chapter III. 



78 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

(phylogenetic), or, as is more convenient, facts 
may be adduced with reference to the devel- 
opment of speech in the child (ontogenetic). 
Introspection may aid in confirming results ob- 
tained by the other methods. 

The reason why we are concerned with the 
origin of immediate and contributory judgments 
rather than with their interrelation in an indi- 
vidual of mature growth, is that we recognize, 
at the start, that a mature individual uses two 
separate and distinct kinds of judgments of 
value, immediate and contributory. It is upon 
this hypothesis that the whole discussion rests. 

The investigation may be divided conveniently 
into two parts: 

A. Origin of immediate judgments; B. Ori- 
gin of contributory judgments. 

A. Origin of Immediate Judgments 
§ 12. The first words that a child uses are 
names of objects. He is taught words that 
symbolize certain perceptions. There is no ques- 
tion of expressing value here. The early stages 
of speech are just as mechanical as the act of 
perception itself. The fixation of meaning to 
certain verbal sounds does not imply that the 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 79 

child has the ability to reflect upon that mean- 
ing. He names the objects that attract his 
attention. 

A young child has wants and needs. His 
attention is attracted to the objects that satisfy 
these wants. Some of his wants are necessary 
to his life — mother, water. But he may reach 
out his hands to grasp the moon, and cry, 
"Moon!" if he were taught the word that 
symbolizes that object. Many of the words 
that he first learns are words that symbolize 
objects that he wants and needs. Some of them 
merely satisfy the need of locating himself in 
his immediate environment. But in no case is 
there any question of his expressing a value. 

Identification of objects with symbols of ex- 
pression, therefore, is not fixing values upon 
objects, however valuable those objects may be 
to him from the standpoint of an observer. But 
the child comes to learn other words. Some of 
these may express feelings of desire, as " want," 
" like." He learns to combine these words with 
certain objects: " Love mother "; " Want milk." 
The case as regards value differs here. The 
child is now expressing a feeling-attitude in a 
simple form of judgment. He is expressing an 



80 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

immediate value in words. He recognizes his 
personal interest. 

Our conclusion, therefore, with respect to the 
origin of judgments of immediate value may be 
expressed in the following proposition: 

The individual recognizes his interest when a 
situation occurs in which he identifies a feeling- 
attitude with words. 

B. Origin of Contributory Judgments 
§ 13. I have illustrated the way in which a 
judgment of immediate value may be expressed 
very simply. The case is not so simple with 
lespect to contributory values. The child has a 
need; let us say he is thirsty. He may have the 
need and be unable to connect his need with 
speech ; he may only cry or make foolish sounds. 
He may know the substance water by name, and 
call out " Water ! " He may express not only 
the object of his desire, but the desire itself, 
and say, "Want water." ' (Here we have the 
expression of an immediate value in the judg- 
ment.) In the last named case, he connects the 
object of desire with the desire itself, but he 
does not express in the judgment the way in 
which the object will satisfy the desire. We 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 81 

infer that when he gets the water his desire 
will disappear; but he does not express the fact 
that the water is for the purpose of satisfying 
the desire, that the water will be the means of 
attaining the end of his wish. 

In the judgment "Want water!" there is 
something lacking to make it express the fact 
that water is of contributory value. The need 
and the object of the need are expressed, but 
not the purpose of the need. To have the latter, 
there must be added some word or words that 
will symbolize the object in the process of satis- 
fying the need. Such symbolism is afforded by 
expressions of purpose, the simplest of which is 
the infinitive (with to or in ing). " Want water 
to drink " or " Want water for drinking " ex- 
presses in a simple way (a) the desire, (b) the 
object of desire, and (c) the fact that the object 
is the principal means of satisfying the desire. 
The third is attained by the use of a word that 
shows the desire in process of fulfilment by the 
use of the object. Here is the first case where 
a contributory value finds expression. 

Reflection will show us that contributory val- 
ues are always accompanied in their expression 
by some statement of their end. They are con- 



82 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

tributory to something, not simply given as good. 
The satisfaction of thirst is an immediate value, 
given as good. I may connect that value with 
the object water, however, without thinking 
specifically of water as " good for " satisfying 
my thirst. The latter process is the outcome 
of reasoning about my desire. It contains the 
reflection that the object that I already want is 
wanted for a purpose which I now make clear 
to myself. Thus introspection confirms my 
previous illustration. 

It may therefore be stated as a proposition, 
that the individual gives expression to a con- 
tributory value first when he uses words that 
show how an object of desire satisfies the end 
of desire. 

§ 14. I have described the simplest situa- 
tions in which the individual expresses an im- 
mediate and a contributory value. There is a 
further stage of expression of contributory 
value. This comes to view when the individual 
goes beyond his own desires in expressing values 
by judgment. He sees that others beside him- 
self have desires and that they may be satisfied 
by certain means. Certain desires he finds to 
be common to his kind. Contributory value 



WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 83 

may then be expressed by a general proposition, 
" Water is good to drink." He may extend 
the application of value still farther. He may 
apply it to objects which further the processes 
of nature, and may say, for example, " The soil 
is good for nourishing the plant." This is one 
way in which contributory values may become 
more and more objective, i.e., divorced from the 
individual who makes the evaluation. So that 
in expressing values by the judgment, we may 
state that contributory values arise in intimate 
association with immediate values, but that, as 
the power of expression develops, they may be- 
come entirely free from immediate values. 

This division of the chapter may be sum- 
marized as follows: 

A. Origin of Immediate Judgments. 

§ 12. The individual first expresses an im- 
mediate value when a situation occurs in which 
he symbolizes a feeling-attitude by a form of 
words. 

B. Origin of Contributory Judgments. 

§ 13. He first expresses a contributory value 
when he uses words that show how an object 
of desire satisfies the end of desire. 



84 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

§ 14. Contributory values in their expres- 
sion in the judgment arise in intimate associa- 
tion with immediate values, but, as the power 
of expression develops, they become free from 
the immediate, so that the individual of mature 
growth may express in the judgment two dis- 
tinct classes of values, immediate and contribu- 
tory. 



CHAPTER V 

THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES 
WITH RESPECT TO THEIR CO-EX- 
ISTENCE 

IN Chapter I, two classes of values were 
defined and distinguished. They were dis- 
covered by introspection, but it was found 
that there is a psychological basis for the dis- 
tinction. Immediate values are grounded in 
the feeling-aspect of consciousness; contribu- 
tory, in the cognitive. The brief treatment of 
Chapter I, however, is inadequate to the im- 
portance of the distinction. In this chapter, I 
purpose more fully to discuss value-relations of 
the individual to his environment. To do this 
successfully, it will be necessary first to inquire 
just what is meant, in this connection, by the 
term " environment." 

The chapter may therefore be divided into 
two main topics: 

I. Environment; II. Environment and Values. 

I. ENVIRONMENT 
§ i. The word "environment" is not re- 
stricted in common usage to the surroundings 

85 



86 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

of a living being. We speak of the " environs " 
of a city, using an almost identical word. It 
would be perfectly possible to speak of the en- 
vironment of a chair or a building. But most 
commonly it is used of the surroundings of a 
plant or animal; that is, an organism is con- 
trasted with surrounding organisms or objects. 
As our sphere of discussion is limited to the 
animal kingdom, we may at the outset limit its 
usage to the contrast between an animal organ- 
ism and its surroundings. 

§ 2. How much of an organism's surround- 
ings does " environment " include ? In an ex- 
tended sense of the word, we might say that 
there is no part of the world of matter and 
motion that does not belong to the environment 
of an organism. The influence of physical laws 
is so far-reaching that very remote physical 
disturbances may influence an organism quite 
apart from his knowledge. The conditions of 
environment may be altered by sun-spots, by 
an earthquake thousands of miles distant, or by 
the temperature of currents of water that wash 
the coast nearest an inland region. Man's en- 
vironment, in a sense, is the world. 

We see, therefore, that environment may be 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 87 

considered to include a great deal. This most 
inclusive use of the word, however, cannot be 
useful to us in a discussion of value; for, by- 
adopting it, we shall only find a synonym for 
" the world." It is desirable for us to restrict 
it in its application. Now there is a time-differ- 
ence between the stimuli that affect an organism 
from its environment. The sun is ultimately 
responsible for my perception of light, but the 
immediate cause is certain light-waves that 
strike the retina of the eye. There is a point 
at which the sensitive protoplasm of an organ- 
ism comes into contact with the world beyond 
itself; there are immediate stimuli that may 
be contrasted with those more remote in time 
and space. It is to these immediate stimuli 
that I shall refer when I speak of the action 
of environment with reference to an organism. 
Environment will designate that part of the 
world which directly influences it, that part 
with which the organism comes into contact. 

§ 3. In reference to a very primitive organ- 
ism, this conception of environment is perfectly 
clear. No explanation was necessary when the 
word was thus used in Chapter III. There the 
contrast between organism and environment was 



88 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

biological, rather than psychological. It was 
clear what was meant by saying that the bio- 
logical indication of the presence of value from 
the standpoint of the organism was the presence 
of a situation in which the organism responded 
to dangerous stimuli from the environment by 
a process originating within itself. The earlier 
stages of conscious activity were taken in their 
biological significance, and they were described 
with reference to the acts themselves. 

In the case of a mature individual, however, 
there is a complication. Here conscious activity 
has reached a highly developed form. Is it 
useful for us still to maintain the biological 
standpoint? When I speak of "my environ- 
ment," am I using the phrase in the biological 
or the psychological sense? The answer that I 
give to these questions will depend largely upon 
my philosophical pre-disposition. The problem 
of the relation between mind and body comes to 
the fore. And I am in danger of entering into 
an epistemological tangle. Let us examine a 
few of the ways that various philosophers may 
regard " environment/' 

(a) The materialist, or the instrumental 
pragmatist, preserves the biological standpoint 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 89 

intact. To him conscious activity is a function 
of certain cells of the body, and " conscious- 
ness " is as much a part of him as his hands 
or his feet. The relation of man to his environ- 
ment is the relation of man considered as body 
plus conscious activity. 

(b) Those who make a difference between 
mental and non-mental, whether they be inter- 
actionists or psycho-physical parallelists, may 
think of environment as the relation of con- 
sciousness to its objects. Environment may 
mean " mental environment " or " physical en- 
vironment. " It may have to do with the rela- 
tion of mind to its objects (psychological) or 
the relation of the physical organism to sur- 
rounding objects (biological) or the relation of 
consciousness to objects in the world (psycho- 
physical). 

(c) Spiritualists (i.e., subjective and objec- 
tive idealists and the like) would find the con- 
trast one between one and another kind of 
mental entities. But the nature of the contrast 
between organism and environment would vary 
with the degree of " objectivity " attributed to 
the physical world. 

§ 4. Now beside being intellectually dishon- 



90 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

est, it would invalidate my reasoning if I should 
use the contrast between organism and environ- 
ment first in one sense, then in another. The 
question of philosophical pre-disposition, on the 
other hand, is not nearly so important as that 
I find a meaning of the contrast that will be 
most useful in the development of my theory 
of value. 

The " process originating within itself," which 
was seen to be the biological concomitant of the 
origin of value from the individual's standpoint, 
is likely to be agreed to be a very rudimentary 
form of conscious activity. In this case, there- 
fore, conscious activity was described wholly 
from the biological point of view. This stand- 
point was found to be entirely adequate to the 
discussion of my theory of value. Why not, 
then, keep to the biological standpoint in my 
discussion of the values of a mature individual? 
It will be seen that, in man, mature conscious 
activity can still be described in terms of the 
standpoint of the organism without trespassing 
beyond the biological aspect. 

§ 5. This point of view is nearest like that 
of the instrumental pragmatists, as developed 
in Creative Intelligence. 1 It must not be in- 

1 New York, 1917. 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 91 

ferred, however, that I count myself one of 
their followers. In this connection there are 
two especial points of difference between us. 

(a) I must refuse to commit myself to a 
decision as to whether existent " reality " is a 
certain or an uncertain quantity. By " reality " 
I mean the physical world. If, however, the 
term be taken to include all that happens, I 
should agree that it is quantitatively uncertain. 

(b) As a logical consequence of their stand- 
point, the instrumental pragmatists get rid of 
" sensations " in the classical use of that term. 
Organisms differ, according to them, chiefly by 
the " emotional tone " of the relation of " or- 
ganic complexes " to other things. 2 While I 
also emphasize the importance of feeling-atti- 
tudes in my theory of value, I am not prepared 
to say that the cognitive aspect of conscious 
activity is not of as great importance to value 
as the feeling-aspect. That is, I recognize that 
the standpoint of the individual, formed by the 
" orientation " of complex relations about a 
center, may be described with respect to the 
value of these relations apart from the aspect 
of their " emotional tone." Nevertheless, it 

2 Cf. Kallen, in Creative Intelligence, 415-416. 



92 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

must be remembered that the individual ac- 
quired a standpoint of his own only when his 
first feeling-attitude appeared. But once the 
individual has attained a standpoint of his 
own, what were formerly relations without any 
" emotional tone " now become relations of in- 
terest to the individual in the cognitive aspect, 
without reference to the acquired " emotional 
tone." 

§ 6. In § 2, environment was defined for 
our purpose as those things which act directly 
upon the organism as stimuli, that with which 
the organism is in direct contact. As this use 
of the word was adopted for our convenience, 
we must be careful not to let it become a source 
of annoyance. It would be such if we conceived 
it with scientific accuracy. For one might ask, 
If my conscious activity is in contact with that 
chair by means of light-waves which strike the 
retina of my eye, are the waves at the very point 
where they meet the retina, my environment? 
This would be to make a practical working defi- 
nition worthless by over-refining it. Practically, 
we shall conceive environment to extend as far 
as our perception will carry us. It will include 
sensational experience, and also that amount of 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 93 

inferential experience which is a part of our 
perception. But it will not include knowledge 
about an object which is buried in memory at 
the time of my perception. Thus, although I 
know that the wood of my chair came from a 
forest, and that some man cut the tree down 
and sawed it, planed, hammered, and polished 
it, the tree in the forest, the woodcutter, the 
saw-mill, the carpenter, the turner, and the 
polisher will not be included in my environment 
so far as my perception of the chair is con- 
cerned. If, however, the thought of these sug- 
gested itself to me as I looked at the chair, they 
would be included in my environment, and their 
importance in it would be determined by the 
extent to which I am familiar with them in 
actual experience. They would be much more 
important if, for instance, I had seen the very 
tree cut down and the whole process of manu- 
facture of the chair, than if I had only read 
about how chairs are made. 

The point that lies behind this argument is 
that conscious activity, conceived as one of the 
functions of an organism, is related to surround- 
ing objects in varying degree, just as other 
functions of the organism are related to sur- 



94 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

rounding matter. The peculiar nature of con- 
scious activity lies in the fact that " contact 
with " is broader and freer here than in the 
case, for example, of a muscle or a hair. The 
importance of this difference for us is that 
value-relations have to do with that portion of 
environment with which conscious activity is in 
contact. 

§ 7. Now conscious activity, after it has 
emerged from what I called in Chapter III the 
" earliest stage of consciousness," is in contact 
with environment under two aspects, cognition 
and feeling. I wish that this statement might 
be accepted without further discussion, but I 
fear that it will be necessary to digress a little 
and treat briefly of certain disputes among psy- 
chologists. 

It is the fashion among psychologists to an- 
alyze their states of consciousness to find out 
what aspects are present, and which may exist 
apart from other aspects. For example, Titch- 
ener asks, " Do we ever attend without feel- 
ing? " 3 He answers, Yes, and points to reflex, 
automatic, and ideo-motor actions, " performed 
without the arousal of pleasantness-unpleasant- 

3 Titchener, E. B., Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of 
Feeling and Attention, 296-302. 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 95 

ness in consciousness." May we, on the other 
hand, feel without attending? Wundt says that 
we may. Titchener says not. The latter adds, 
" I incline rather to find a fairly close parallel 
between degree of clearness [his criterion of 
attention] and degree of pleasantness-unpleas- 
antness, and thus to regard the relation between 
affection and attention, on this side, not as ex- 
ternal, but as intrinsic." 

Another dispute relates to the number and 
nature of affective qualities. Wundt's tri-dimen- 
sional theory of feeling postulates pleasantness- 
unpleasantness, excitement-tranquilisation, and 
tension-relaxation as the three " dimensions of 
affection." Thereupon psychologists introspect 
their feelings. Some, as Titchener, find only 
one dimension. The tri-dimensionalists speak 
slightingly of the "Dogma der Lust-Unlust- 
theorie" 

My criticism of such disputes, of which there 
are many, is twofold. The psychologists who 
indulge in them are (a) biased by a predis- 
position to hold the theory of psycho-physical 
parallelism. Consequently, conscious activity is 
not conceived by them in the act itself, but 
epiphenomenally. The stimuli from environ- 



96 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

ment are conceived as affecting the physical 
part of the organism, while it becomes of inter- 
est to inquire what happens at the same time 
in consciousness. Much opportunity is thereby 
afforded for introspective observation, but very 
little hope that correct conclusions may be 
reached. Consciousness is conceived as follow- 
ing alongside physical processes. It is assumed 
that these processes may throw off effects in 
consciousness, may partly do so, or may go 
along blissfully by themselves. 

Again (b) y the nature of these disputes im- 
plies that consciousness may be divided into 
" faculties." When it is asked whether atten- 
tion may exist without feeling, the unit of con- 
scious activity is set aside. Cognition, feeling, 
and attention lose their character as aspects. 
The mere putting of such a question almost 
assumes that attention and feeling are separate 
parts of consciousness which often appear to- 
gether, but which might well be conceived some- 
times to be separated, only one appearing. At- 
tention, throughout, seems to be regarded as 
cognitive attention. At least, psychologists in- 
trospect to discover whether they are attending, 
and the introspective process is certainly cog- 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 97 

nitive. They also introspect to discover whether 
they are feeling pleasantness or unpleasantness, 
and assume that, if they could not discover such 
a feeling, the feeling aspect would not be pres- 
ent. What about the pleasant feeling of strok- 
ing that a cat sometimes experiences? Is this 
dependent upon her knowing that she has it? 

§ 8. Against such a point of view let me 
place a theory recommended by its simplicity 
and its ability to fit in with facts of observation. 

Conscious activity is always one in its func- 
tioning. There are certain distinct aspects of 
conscious activity, however, and sometimes one 
of these is more prominent than another. Such 
is generally the case. It would be difficult to 
conceive of a situation in which attention, pleas- 
antness or unpleasantness, and cognition were 
present in the same degree.. Some form of con- 
templation would approach nearest to this con- 
dition, but contemplatives actually advise their 
disciples to keep attention away from feeling as 
far as possible. 

But where conscious activity is just emerging 
from non-conscious, there are not such pro- 
nounced aspects. Here there is a sensitive con- 
dition which doubtless exhibits the rudiments of 



98 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

cognition, feeling, and will; but none of these 
appears in a prominent way. It is curious how 
willing some psychologists (except those who 
are " gefuhlsempfindungen" theorists) are to 
admit that feeling is of " elemental rank in con- 
sciousness " 4 but yet discuss the question of 
whether it need be present with other elements. 
I think that this is due to the epiphenomenalistic 
attitude of such writers. 

In later stages of development, one aspect of 
conscious activity is more prominent than others. 
The mistake of many psychologists is their cheer- 
ful assumption that, with the prominence of one 
aspect over others, the others disappear. But 
conscious activity is in contact with environment 
as a whole, not in a divided state. There is no 
warrant whatever for the supposition that, in 
a mature conscious individual, aspects of con- 
scious activity are transitory, flitting on and off 
the stage of consciousness. This view reeks of 
epiphenomenalism. The only support for such 
a theory is derived from introspection, which 
cannot be depended upon in this connection, as 
it is a cognitive process. 

§ 9. For my present purpose, the importance 

4 Titchener, op. cit., 289. 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 99 

of my theory lies in the fact that, if it be a true 
description of what takes place, the feeling- 
attitude, or the " affective side " of conscious 
activity, must be regarded as present, even when 
it is not exhibited by feelings of pleasantness- 
unpleasantness. The latter feelings may better 
be regarded as cases where the feeling side is 
uppermost in conscious activity, not where feel- 
ing is absent. 

The obvious consequence of my theory is that 
conscious activity is related to environment as 
directly through feeling as through cognition. 
Logical knowledge may well be the best instru- 
ment for dealing with reality. It might be main- 
tained (though this is open to question) that 
cognition is the sole means by which we increase 
the extent of our contact with reality. But these 
admissions will in no way prove that " contact 
with " is limited to the cognitive aspect of con- 
sciousness; they will not remove the possibility 
that our " contact with " contains elements of 
feeling which have never resulted from cog- 
nition. Furthermore, the fact that we increase 
our contact with reality through cognition does 
not prove that the feelings which are aroused 
by the directive influence of cognition are de- 



ioo VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

pendent in their whole meaning upon the cog- 
nitive processes. They may have an independ- 
ent relation to reality apart from cognition. 

This doctrine may sound strange, and yet it 
fits in well with the facts of experience. It tells 
me that the portion of reality with which I am 
in contact is not restricted to what I am con- 
scious of through sensations and ideas, but that 
it also includes that portion with which I am in 
contact through the feeling-element of conscious- 
ness. This is neither to say, with Rickert, that 
knowledge is determined through the feelings, 
nor with the older psychologists, that feeling is 
dependent upon sensation. I mean rather that 
the portion of reality with which I am in contact 
is richer and fuller in my experience of it than 
the knowledge of it which I obtain through the 
senses ; and that, in denning " contact with " 
environment, I must include a certain relation 
to reality directly by feeling, and not indirectly 
through sensation. In the higher stages of con- 
scious activity, the presence of sensation may 
be the only path to the broadening of environ- 
ment; our experience of environment is always 
partly sensational; but in itself environment is 
more than relation to reality through sensation. 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 101 

Of course this has nothing whatever to do with 
the theory that we can obtain knowledge di- 
rectly through feeling, or the theory that we 
can increase our " contact with " environment 
by plunging into states of feeling where cog- 
nition is at a minimum. 

I may give a few examples to illustrate direct 
contact with the environment through the feeling 
side of consciousness, where the latter predomi- 
nates over the cognitive aspect. Such examples 
can be drawn only from observation of the rela- 
tion of others to their environment, and from 
self-analysis based on knowledge gained after 
the experience that is instanced. Both of these 
methods of illustration apply in the following 
case : We notice in the experience of others and 
recall in our own past experience that we often 
conceive a sudden dislike for a person at first 
meeting. Later on, when we know him better, 
we discover why we dislike him. Traits are 
exhibited by him, opinions expressed, that are 
foreign to our point of view. Cognition has 
here confirmed the impression made upon us 
that resulted in a feeling-attitude. Women in 
general are reputed to be more " intuitive " in 
this way than men. Again, I am forced very 



102 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

often to act when I am ignorant of some of 
the circumstances which should determine my 
action. On such occasions I either guess at 
the best course of action, or rely on a " feeling 
for " one course. To say that such a " feeling " 
is determined wholly by the general texture of 
my ideas and feelings, rather than by some kind 
of contact with the situation in hand, is to be 
dogmatic, and to beg the question. 

I may add that my theory, if true, would 
prove to be of the greatest service to religious 
apologists. Feeling and emotion have been em- 
phasized by most religions, so much so, in fact, 
that Arnold defined religion as " morality tinged 
with emotion." Now if the emotion associated 
with a religious experience (and let it be remem- 
bered that I believe feeling to be wholly psycho- 
logical and " subjective ") has no point of con- 
tact with reality, if, that is, religious emotion is 
subordinate and a by-product of consciousness, 
it cannot be of much greater importance to 
religious experience than as a stimulus to action. 
The Christian faith, however, makes much of 
love between God and man. It claims that God 
bestows love upon his creatures and that man 
can return this love. From the Christian point 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 103 

of view, therefore, emotion is a way of being in 
contact with environment. I do not say coming 
into contact with a spiritual world, although 
mystics and quietists make much of it as a 
method. In point of fact, Christian teachers 
of ascetic theology warn their pupils not to try 
to obtain " spiritual sweetness," as they call it. 
They even claim that " spiritual dryness " is a 
stage of progress in advance of the spiritual 
sweetness that is likely to attend the first efforts 
for spiritual progress. 

The same argument that is advanced with 
respect to contact with personalities on earth 
and with God, may also be applied to prayer 
and to communion with saints and angels. It 
proves nothing, of course. It only shows a 
possible means of intercourse, provided that 
spiritual beings form a portion of reality. It 
shows, too, how a worshipper need not be bound 
to his own conceptions of the spiritual world in 
order to worship effectively (that is, again, pro- 
vided Christian beliefs are grounded in reality). 
The peasant woman of limited intelligence, who 
gradually comes to identify the Virgin with the 
grotesque statue in front of which she is pray- 
ing, may not pray ineffectively. The experience 



104 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

is always richer than the sensations and ideas 
that are derived from it. 

II. ENVIRONMENT AND VALUES 
Having built a foundation by discussion of 
the meaning of environment and of the relation 
of an organism to its environment, we may pro- 
ceed to the erection of a theory of co-existent 
values. I think that it will scarcely be disputed 
that whatever is of interest to conscious activity 
is valuable from the standpoint of that conscious 
activity. At the emergence of consciousness, 
the individual acquired a standpoint of his own. 
Conscious activity, starting in a rudimentary 
way, develops and increases the scope of its 
function. In the process of development, it 
widens in its contact with environment. Its 
relations to environment are value relations. 

§ 10. Everything with which conscious ac- 
tivity comes into contact is valuable both as 
contributory and as immediate. Inasmuch as 
cognition and feeling are aspects of the same 
consciousness, objects of the environment will 
be related to conscious activity both as cognitive 
and affective. From the cognitive point of 
view, these relations are relations of contribu- 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 105 

tory value. The objects related are " good 
for " some purpose. They are guide-posts to 
conscious activity in its contact with environ- 
ment. They help it find its way in and among 
other objects with which it is not in contact. 
They are the interests of consciousness from 
one point of view. 

But conscious activity is also related to the 
objects with which it is in contact from the feel- 
ing side. These relations are relations of imme- 
diate values. It is not necessary that pleasant- 
ness-unpleasantness be recognized to make ob- 
jects of immediate value. All that is necessary 
is that there be a feeling-tone of conscious activ- 
ity, and this affective aspect is present in all but 
the earliest stage of consciousness. The nestful 
of tggs y the " never-to-be-too-much-set-upon 
object" of the hen (James), does not demand 
the presence of recognition of pleasantness on 
the part of the hen to make it of immediate 
value to her. She probably never thought of it 
as pleasant; it was only " never-to-be-too-much- 
set-upon." Kallen 5 gives a good treatment of 
immediate values as relations of the organism's 
conscious activity to environment, but he wholly 
disregards the contributory aspect of value. 

5 Creative Intelligence, 412 ff. 



106 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

§ ii. In Chapter III, the cognitive and feel- 
ing sides of conscious activity were spoken of 
as two directions in which that activity has 
developed. They diverge from a point at which 
conscious activity conies into contact with en- 
vironment. At only one point in the develop- 
ment of the organism is this divergence from 
an undifferentiated conscious activity to be ob- 
served, namely, at the first appearance of con- 
sciousness in an organism. But since the indi- 
vidual comes into contact with new factors of 
environment constantly, it becomes of interest 
to inquire just how new relations with the new 
objects are established. 

It is quite conceivable that conscious activity, 
a single function exhibiting two aspects, might 
react to stimuli from the environment at one 
time chiefly in one aspect, at another, chiefly in 
another. That is, in the case of a mature con- 
sciousness, we cannot speak with so great a 
confidence of a recurrence of the primitive con- 
dition of conscious activity whenever a new con- 
tact with environment is established. Our doubt 
is confirmed by comparing the functions of other 
organs and organisms. In plants, for example, 
we find a great variety of highly developed 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 107 

organs which serve special adaptive purposes. 
The organs which perform these functions took 
their origin from cells whose protoplasm was ex- 
ceedingly sensitive to a great variety of stimuli. 
But when once certain cambial cells become 
differentiated into root, stem, leaf, or repro- 
ductive cells, it is usually very hard to change 
their direction of development. Of course there 
are exceptions : some of the hepatics have a gen- 
erous susceptibility to regeneration from vege- 
tative cells, and we all know how the shoots of 
some trees may be stuck into the ground with 
the result that root cells become differentiated 
from the cambium, and a tree grows up. The 
latter example, of course, only shows the un- 
differentiated character of cambial tissue; old 
cells seldom change their function. 

Now the fact that conscious activity has two 
aspects which fluctuate in preponderance shows 
that the sensitive character of consciousness is 
not determined in growth along one hard and 
fast line. And yet this is not to say that 
primitive conscious activity must necessarily be 
reenacted every time consciousness is stimulated 
by a new environmental factor. Conscious ac- 
tivity might be just fluid enough to respond to 



108 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

some stimuli on the cognitive side, and to others 
on the feeling side. It is extremely difficult to 
describe what I mean in simple language. Per- 
haps a very imperfect illustration may aid me. 
Imagine two insulated wires wound together, 
but connected at one end. These may represent 
the two aspects of conscious activity taking their 
origin at a point where there is no differentiation 
into aspects, but continuing together inseparably 
after differentiation has taken place. The point 
of connection, however, is not the only connec- 
tion with environment. Connection occurs at 
many places along the line. The question is: 
Is the connection with new points made by each 
of the wound wires touching the environment 
at various points, or by a wire at each point that 
touches the new factor and immediately divides 
into two wires that make connection with the 
main wires? 

It may seem that I am asking questions which 
I ought not to ask in view of my disapproval of 
disputes as to whether we can attend without 
feeling or feel without attending. This is not 
so, however. It is not a question of what con- 
scious activity can do, but of how the environ- 
ment comes into connection with conscious ac- 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 109 

tivity. Frankly, I do not know how this real 
question may be answered. I do not know how 
to apply scientific method in such a case, and I 
am sure that the method of introspection would 
be quite inadequate, because one cannot even 
observe the feeling side of consciousness when 
that aspect is not predominant and exhibited in 
consciousness by pleasantness or unpleasantness. 
At least I may be permitted to speculate on 
the matter. The basis for my own belief is my 
view of the nature of the earliest stage of con- 
sciousness. I do not believe in James's " bloom- 
ing, buzzing confusion." It seems to me that 
this is far too complicated for the earliest stage 
of consciousness. It would better describe a 
mature state of conscious activity which never 
had a chance to function in some strange envi- 
ronment into which it was suddenly plunged. 
Nor do I believe that " pure sensations " are 
entirely "simple" (in the sense of single). I 
believe that the earliest stage of conscious activ- 
ity is a situation where at least two factors are 
discriminated and the feeling side is present, 
though very rudimentary. (I have read some- 
where that Esquimaux brought to Broadway, 
New York City, did not seem alarmed by the 



no VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

buzzing confusion, but were quite unconcerned 
until they saw some skins hanging in a furrier's 
window. ) 

It seems probable to me that, when a new 
factor of environment comes into contact with 
conscious activity, something of the same nature 
occurs. If it does, it is so quickly connected 
with memory images and the affective stream 
that to notice it, even in its cognitive aspect, is 
almost impossible. For this point of contact 
with environment, realized at the origin of con- 
scious activity, and again realized over and over, 
as new factors of environment come into relation 
with consciousness, I know no better term than 
" sensation," which may be considered in this 
connection to include the affective element (sen- 
tire means almost anything in the way of per- 
ception or affection). When sensation occurs, 
the sensitive protoplasm delays in its course be- 
fore responding to a stimulus; a moment passes 
and it blossoms out into cognition and affection, 
and is associated with accumulated memory 
images in the main stream. Sensation, thus 
considered, would be the bridge between cog- 
nition and feeling. 

§ 12. New values, therefore, the outcome of 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE in 

new relations with environment, do not conflict 
with old values in respect to their origin. But 
they are modified by old values almost as soon 
as they appear. If this were not so, but if, on 
the contrary, new values retained their complete 
independence, we should be very inconsistent in 
our views of life. We are "that, and it is just 
because we have systems of value-relations that 
are more or less isolated one from another that 
we are so. This inconsistency may be trivial, 
or it may reach to abnormal proportions where 
dissociation of personality occurs. 

§ 13. So far as value is concerned, we may 
see that the advantage of a mature conscious- 
ness over the earliest stage of consciousness lies 
in the ability of the former to control new values 
by means of registered memory-images. This 
control, I believe, though direct proof would be 
difficult, also comes about by reference of new 
affective elements to the affective side of mature 
conscious activity. But the main control is 
through ideas; and one chief element of the 
process of " gaining experience " is learning to 
control feelings by ideas. The experience of 
the primitive organism is narrower because the 
cognitive elements are simpler. 



ii2 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

§ 14. A corollary, requiring no proof, is that 
value-relations with the same objects change 
according as the objects are found useful in 
new ways, or as feeling-attitudes toward them 
change. 

§15. No proof also is needed for this corol- 
lary: Every object with which conscious activ- 
ity is in relation is of both contributory and 
immediate value, but there is no constant ratio 
between the contributory and immediate values 
which exist by the relation of conscious activity 
to any one object. 

Chapter V may be summarized as follows: 
I. Environment. 

§ 1. The word "environment" in our dis- 
cussion will be limited in its use to the sur- 
roundings of an animal organism. 

§ 2. Environment will designate that part of 
the world with which an organism comes into 
direct contact. 

§ 3. Whether the contrast between man and 
his environment is to be thought of wholly from 
the biological point of view depends upon one's 
philosophical predisposition. 

(a) The materialist and the instrumental 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 113 

pragmatist preserve the biological point of view 
intact. 

(b) Those who make a difference between 
the mental and the non-mental may make the 
contrast psychological, biological, or psycho- 
physical. 

(c) Spiritualists would give varying an- 
swers, depending upon the degree of " objec- 
tivity " which they attribute to the physical 
world. 

§ 4. In man, conscious activity may still be 
described in terms of the standpoint of the 
organism without trespassing beyond the bio- 
logical aspect. 

§ 5. This viewpoint is nearest like that of 
the instrumental pragmatists, with two reserva- 
tions : 

(a) I do not commit myself to a decision 
as to whether the physical world is certain or 
uncertain in quantity. 

(b) The cognitive aspect of conscious ac- 
tivity must not be minimized. 

§ 6. Our use of " environment " is practical, 
rather than scrupulously exact. 

§ 7. In discussing the contrast between man 
and his environment from the biological point 



H4 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

of view, we must take care not to conceive con- 
sciousness as epiphenomenal, or to divide con- 
scious activity into " faculties." 

§ 8. Conscious activity is always one in op- 
eration, but it has two distinct aspects, one of 
which is generally more prominent than the 
other. 

§ 9. Conscious activity is related to envi- 
ronment as directly through its feeling-aspect 
as through cognition. Some practical conse- 
quences. 

II. Environment and Values. 

§ 10. Everything with which conscious ac- 
tivity comes into contact is valuable from both 
the contributory and the immediate points of 
view. 

§ 11. It is probably true that, both in the 
case of the origin of conscious activity and in 
the case of contact of an existing conscious 
activity with new factors of environment, sensa- 
tion is the bridge between cognition and feeling. 

§ 12. New values do not conflict with old 
values so far as origin is concerned, but the 
former are modified by the latter. 

§ 13. The advantage of a mature conscious- 



WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 115 

ness over the earliest stage of consciousness, so 
far as value is concerned, is the ability of the 
former to control new values on the basis of 
past experience. 

§ 14. Value-relations with the same objects 
change according as the objects are found useful 
in new ways, or as feeling-attitudes toward them 
change. 

§ 15. Every object with which conscious ac- 
tivity is in relation, is of both contributory and 
immediate value; but there is no constant ratio 
between the contributory and immediate values 
that exist by virtue of the relation of conscious 
activity to any one object. 



PART II 
WINDELBAND'S THEORY OF NORMS 



CHAPTER VI 

SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE 

THE terms " subjective " and " objec- 
tive," applied to values, have pro- 
voked much discussion. They may be 
used in a variety of ways, and a part of the 
diversity of opinion that prevails among value- 
philosophers is due to their slippery nature. 
As values are relations of interest between 
conscious activity and environment, both con- 
sciousness and environment are factors in the 
experiencing of values. I might think chiefly 
of the objects valued, and say that all values 
are objective; or I might think chiefly of my 
conscious activity which forms or finds values, 
and say that all values are subjective. There 
is no room for dispute when the words are used 
in so general a way. 

Correct application of the terms is not so 
easy, however, if I inquire which term of a 
value-relation functions chiefly in the formation 
of the relation. I then ask, " What makes a 
certain object valuable? Is it valuable because 

119 

9 



120 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

it contains within itself the power to enter into 
a value-relation? Or is it valuable because my 
conscious activity has the power to draw it into 
such a relation ? Do I make it valuable, or does 
it compel me to recognize that it is valuable ? " 

I find objects to be of contributory value 
when they serve certain ends. They seem to 
have functions within themselves. A crowbar 
is good for raising a stone because it has quali- 
ties of strength and rigidity that permit of its 
being used as a lever. Food is good for nour- 
ishment because it contains substances which 
have the ability to replenish energy in animal 
cells. Such contributory values certainly owe 
their being to functions of the objects valued, 
and it is natural to speak of such values as 
" objective." 

Other contributory values have been fixed in 
an arbitrary way. Save for a general agree- 
ment among men, a dollar bill would not be 
good for the purchase of a certain quantity of 
a commodity. Here the value of the bill is not 
inherent in the nature of the piece of paper with 
a certain form of printing on it; the power of 
purchase is not a function of the object as such. 
And yet, when men have agreed that a dollar 



SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE 121 

bill shall have a definite purchasing value, the 
power of purchase has become a function of 
the object. Therefore we may call economic 
values objective, also. 

Judgments were found to be contributory. 
They have the power of putting those who make 
them or those who learn them into touch with 
their environment in such a way that conscious 
activity makes progress when it judges, as it 
could not if it did not judge. Judgments, there- 
fore, have functions which they perform. They 
may also be considered to be objective. 

All contributory values may be termed objec- 
tive. But a question arises when we come to 
consider immediate values. Are the things that 
I like, want, demand, and feel-toward, valuable 
because the things themselves possess the func- 
tion of satisfying my wants and demands? I 
like peaches. Now peaches, considered as a 
food, good for rebuilding bodily tissues, are of 
contributory value. But there is another kind 
of value associated with peaches, when I con- 
sider simply my liking. I may like them; an- 
other person may dislike them. They would 
serve as wholesome food for each of us. The 
contributory aspect must not be confused with 



122 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

another aspect of value, that of my taste for 
them. Is this taste objective? Do the peaches 
draw me irresistibly to themselves, or do I go 
to them because my conscious activity has a 
peach-loving quality? 

Most persons will agree that tastes for certain 
foods go with the individual, rather than with 
the object. They will agree that some imme- 
diate values are not objective, but subjective. 
There are certain groups of values, however, 
which stand in doubt. Is a work of art beau- 
tiful because I have a taste that appreciates it, 
although others might not agree with my taste? 
Or is it beautiful because it conforms to a norm 
of beauty quite independent of my taste, and to 
which I am compelled to give assent ? Are cer- 
tain actions that I contemplate right because I 
think of them in that way, or because they con- 
form to standards of right that appeal to my 
conscience ? 

An analogous question arises in the case of 
" secondary qualities/' Are these objective in 
the Lockian sense? 1 Or are they, not " powers 

1 Cf. Locke, John, Bssay concerning Human Understanding, 
II, VIII, § 23 : " The power that is in any body, by reason of its 
insensible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on 
any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas 
of several colors, sounds, smells, tastes, &c." 



SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE 123 

in the object," but merely the forms in which 
primary qualities clothe themselves in conscious 
activity? Of course the answer to this ques- 
tion is quite independent of that to the question 
whether immediate values are subjective or ob- 
jective. 

Rickert, Windelband, and others believe that 
not only in the moral and aesthetic spheres, but 
also in the logical sphere, there are to be found 
immediate values objective in character. They 
argue that facts imply judgments, that feeling 
enters into the determination of facts, and that 
truth is an objective, logical norm. Some of 
the inconsistencies of Rickert's position have 
already been discussed. 2 The standpoint that 
recognition of truth is, in the last analysis, inde- 
pendent of inference and perceptual phenomena 
is of great assistance to those who would argue 
for the objective character of immediate values 
in the moral and aesthetic spheres. If it be 
true that existence is dependent upon knowledge 
(metaphysics upon epistemology, the Kantian 
position), reality and "immediate truth" are 
the same, and the permanent character of the 
logical norms will argue for the permanent char- 

2 Chapter II. 



124 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

acter of norms in other regions. Through much 
of the following discussion it is impossible not 
to feel that the battle is often against a ghost 
that has already been laid — the phantom of 
Kantian epistemology. And yet, how effectu- 
ally it has been laid is open to doubt when we 
read these words of a recent writer: "All that 
ought to be common property since the days 
of Kant and Fichte, and every new time only 
demands a new adjustment of these funda- 
mental insights to the changing knowledge of 
the period. ,, 3 

The attractiveness of the position that there 
are objective immediate values seems to me to 
lie, not in the support of the theory by Kantian 
epistemology, but in the facts ( i ) that the theory 
sets forth a teleological order of progress and 
gives permanence to man's ideals, (2) that there 
is associated with it the conception of a power 
in nature superior to the blind forces whose out- 
come is natural selection, (3) that under the 
theory man is able to take part in world-develop- 
ment, and (4) that conscience and responsibility 
are explained as directed toward actions that 
are of more than contingent import. 

3 Munsterberg, The Eternal Values, 49. 



SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE 125 

In my endeavor to determine whether there 
are objective immediate values, I shall choose 
for careful analysis the work of a representa- 
tive of the objective point of view. Rickert's 
treatment of the subject is most acute from 
the logical standpoint, but it is academic and 
does not afford the broad outlook of Windel- 
band's. I shall therefore examine Windel- 
band's arguments, as contained in the two 
essays of " Praeludien," entitled, " Immanuel 
Kant " 4 and " Normen und Naturgesetze." 5 

4 Windelband, Wilhelm, Immanuel Kant, in Praeludien, 5U3 ed., 
1915, I, 1 12-146. 

5 Windelband, Wilhelm, Normen und Naturgesetze, ibid., II, 
59-98. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE THEORY OF NORMS 

WINDELBAND'S interest in the prob- 
lem of immediate values is incidental 
to his interest in the problem of free- 
dom of the will. 1 He seeks a theory which will 
allow freedom and which, at the same time, will 
admit within its scope the deterministic forces 
which operate in nature. The problem of free- 
dom, in turn, is resolved into the problem of the 
nature of accountability. 2 Unless we felt that 
we were accountable for our actions, we should 
never have the sense of acting freely. 

Accountability, according to Windelband, is 
present not only in the moral field, but also in 
the fields of thought and feeling. 3 In the latter, 
it is independent of any expectation of reward 
or punishment, and may there be studied in 
its purity. One feels that there are commands 
which one ought to obey, from which, in the 
actual process of thought and feeling, he often 
deviates. There is not only a moral conscience, 

1 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 59. 

2 Id., II, 60. 
*Id. } II, 64. 

126 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 127 

but also a logical and an aesthetic conscience. 4 
Man feels a duty and an obligation to fulfil 
the commands given him in the three fields. 
Windelband's explanation of this triple con- 
science is that it serves a pedagogical purpose 5 
in leading men to follow those rules or norms 
of thinking, feeling, and willing which are char- 
acterized by their inherent importance over all 
other ways of thinking, willing, and feeling. 
These rules are norms whose realization in 
human nature we are gradually approaching by 
a kind of elimination comparable to, but not 
identical with, the law of natural selection. 6 
The feeling of obligation, or duty, is the push 
that we receive in the direction of fulfilling a 
normal demand, the nature of the push being 
an attraction from the norm itself. 7 The feel- 
ing of accountability arises when we realize that 
our characters and nothing else are the cause of 
our thoughts, actions, and feelings, and remorse 
arises if we feel pain in the knowledge that we 
could not have acted differently from the way 
in which we did act. 8 

*Id., 11,67. 5 Id., II, 95- 

*Id., II, 74- "Id., II, 80. 

8 Id., II, 94- 



128 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

I shall divide my discussion of Windelband's 
position into a number of sections, as follows: 

I. Kant or Realism? 
II. Evolution and the Norms. 

III. The Parallel between Denken, Fuhlen, and 

Wollen. 

IV. Independence of the Norms from Par- 

ticular Consciousnesses. 
V. Freedom and Responsibility. 

I. KANT OR REALISM? 
Windelband, in common with others who de- 
fend an objective theory of immediate value, 
founds his argument on what he believes to be 
basic principles of philosophy achieved once and 
for all by the Kantian criticism. The essay 
Immanuel Kant is in praise of Kant's critical 
view over the older Greek view of knowledge 
as a subject-object relation. In statement of 
my view, I cannot do better than to refer again 
to the essay The Emancipation of Metaphysics 
from Epistemology, by Walter T. Marvin, in 
The New Realism. 9 The particular portion of 
Marvin's argument which I wish to employ in 

9 The New Realism, New York, 1912, pp. 43-95- 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 129 

my criticism of Windelband is that expressed 
in the title of the fourth chapter of his essay, 
" Epistemology does not give, but presupposes, 
a theory of reality." 

The argument of Marvin is with reference 
to the whole Kantian epistemology. I wish to 
show, however, that, after accepting the Kantian 
standpoint, Windelband does not keep to it con- 
sistently, but places the norms against a realistic 
background. 

§ 1. In the essay Immanuel Kant, 10 he says, 
" The truth is that Kant has denned as the 
problem of philosophy reflection on the basis 
of the principles of Reason, i.e., the absolute 
norms, and that this reflection, far from being 
exhausted by the rules of thinking, only finds 
its conclusion through the rules of willing and 
feeling. ,, This is to say that the frame in 
which our experience is cast consists of norms 
of willing and feeling as well as norms of think- 
ing. Taken all together, the norms constitute 
the rules of all possible experience. 

In the essay Normen und Naturgesetze, how- 
ever, we find quite a different conception of 
norms. Here 1X Windelband contrasts the laws 

10 Windelband, Praeludien, I, 141. lx Id., II, 72. 



130 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

of nature with the norms. Having previously 
denned laws of nature in Kantian fashion as 
" those general judgments about the succession 
of psychical events, in which we recognize the 
existence of psychical activity, and from which 
we are able to derive the separate facts of the 
psychical life," 12 he speaks of the operation of 
the norms as only partly identical with the oper- 
ation of the laws of nature. 13 He says: 

All norms are thus special forms of the realization 
of natural laws. The system of norms represents a 
selection out of the infinite manifoldness of the forms 
of combination under which, according to the individual 
circumstances, the natural laws of the psychical life can 
unfold themselves. The laws of logic are a selection 
from the possible forms of the association of ideas; 
the laws of ethics are a selection from the possible forms 
of motivation; the laws of aesthetics are a selection 
from the possible forms of feeling activity. 

In this essay, norms appear as a selection from 
a manifold of possible — and actual — experi- 
ences; in the former essay, they are the con- 
ditions of any possible experience at all. This 
change of viewpoint, however, necessitates drop- 

12 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 65. 13 Id., II, 72. 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 131 

ping the Kantian conception of norms as the 
framework of all possible experience, and shift- 
ing the conception to that of norms operating 
against a background of laws of nature. 

§ 2. Windelband might regard the laws of 
nature as the Kantian framework and the norms 
as additional laws existing together with them 
and exerting a selective influence which is felt 
in the individual through the triple conscience. 
In point of fact, however, he steadfastly re- 
gards the norms as identical with the Kantian 
" Regeln." His treatment brings out the diffi- 
culty of the Kantian position in the matter of 
defining truth. Where reality is simply the 
experienced, the conception of a mechanistic reg- 
ulation must work equally well in false as in true 
judgments. And where Regeln of willing and 
feeling are united with those of thinking, as 
conditions of possible experience, " truth " is 
applied to all experience (in some way). Win- 
delband says, " Thus, in the greatest philoso- 
phers, science recognizes by her side the ethical 
and the aesthetic sense as determining factors 
of the highest truth." 14 Truth here is consid- 
ered to have epistemological reference to all 

14 Id., I, 141. 



132 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

the elements of experience. In the other essay, 
however, it is the logical norms alone which have 
the " Zweck der Wahrheit." 15 It is again evi- 
dent that the possible content of experience is 
here thought of as consisting of more than the 
known. 

§ 3. The difficulty of Windelband's theory of 
norms in its relation to the Kantian Regeln is 
also brought out in his discussion of the inde- 
pendence of the norms from particular con- 
sciousnesses. 16 He is right in his thesis that it 
is not necessary for the individual in whom the 
norms are working to be aware of the fact, if 
the norms are Kantian Regeln] but how will 
they be any more present if the individual is 
conscious of them? It is not the consciousness 
or the lack of consciousness of the norms that 
primarily causes the trouble, but the position 
that there can be degrees of presence, or, rather, 
that there can ever be absence. The difficulty 
of the Kantian position in general in explaining 
why it is that the Regeln are consciously present 
as Regeln to so few persons is a different objec- 
tion — one that is discussed by A. J. Balfour in 

15 Windelband, Praeludien. II, 84. 

16 Id., I, 83. 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 133 

A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, Chapter VI. 
To say that norms exist independently of any 
particular consciousness, in the full sense of 
independence, would be Kantian suicide. 

The considerations which I have adduced 
seem to me to make it evident that Windelband 
has at least unconsciously modified the Kantian 
position in his treatment of norms. He seems 
to adopt a position of " naive realism " ; the 
norms and the laws of nature must work to- 
gether in reality. In giving up the full Kantian 
point of view, Windelband's theory loses some 
of the plausibility that it gained when the norms 
were presented in the guise of epistemological 
necessity, but the theory remains an attractive 
one. We are now compelled to assume that 
norms have a metaphysical existence; and, once 
this is done, there is always the possibility of a 
pre-established harmony between the psychic and 
the cosmic processes. I am not sure whether 
such a possibility can be disproved. The safe 
line of argument, the one adopted here, is to 
show that, unless the assumption of the meta- 
physical existence of norms is made at the start, 
the arguments advanced to establish that exist- 
ence fail. 



134 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

II. EVOLUTION AND THE NORMS 
§ 4. Windelband assumes that the world is 
actually the world that science describes to us. 
It has objective being; the law of causation is 
its binding principle. It is a deterministic uni- 
verse in the sense that the causal series described 
by science is the actual one and the only one 
possible. The causal sequence of nature tends 
to become known to man by natural processes. 
Man is able to observe, and to infer the nature 
of the factors of evolution which have led to 
the present result. 

Especially conspicuous to man is the inequal- 
ity which exists between the factors of evolu- 
tion. The development of the whole is pur- 
posive in the direction of the triumph of the 
most weighty factors. Nature is conceived as 
a mass of activities of which some few are des- 
tined to survive, either because of their fitness 
in the struggle for existence (by natural selec- 
tion) or because of their inherent importance. 
Windelband observes that some of the psychical 
factors which are of inherent importance also 
aid in the struggle for existence, as for ex- 
ample, cleverness, and - the transcendental laws 
of thought. 17 But he notes that others, such as 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 135 

the moral and aesthetic factors, are of indiffer- 
ent value in the struggle for existence and are 
often positively detrimental. He accounts for 
their persistence by saying that they must have 
an inherent importance. 18 A distinction between 
factors of quantitative importance in the physi- 
cal world and norms of qualitative importance 
in the psychical world would bring out Windel- 
band's meaning. 

Strictly speaking, the comparison between 
physical and psychical factors in evolution is 
not a parallel. The world is a unity, and the 
field of struggle the same for each group of 
factors. (The unity here is the fact that there 
is only one evolution in the physical world.) 
The working out of the causal process produces 
a great variety of organisms and psychical char- 
acters. The important characters become fixed 
gradually by the weeding out of the others. 
The wide variation in importance between the 
different characters necessitates the elimination 
of the less important characters. Saying that 
there is a difference of " importance " is ex- 
pressed in another way by saying that nature 
is purposeful in developing certain characters 

17 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 76 ff. « Id., II, 80. 

10 



136 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

at the expense of certain others. These im- 
portant factors, as we have seen, are of a differ- 
ent nature in the physical and psychical worlds. 
The most pregnant criticism of such a view 
of evolution lies in a consideration of its work- 
ability. The difficulty rests in the incompati- 
bility of two sets of factors: factors whose 
survival-value is determined by their quanti- 
tative strength, and factors whose importance 
is due to a qualitative intensity. Windelband 
observes that, at the present stage of evolution, 
these factors are often in opposition, and, one 
may ask, what hope is there of a reconciliation? 
Sooner or later there must be a reckoning; and, 
judging from the fact that the realization of 
psychical factors is dependent upon the presence 
of favorable physical processes, we should infer 
that, no matter how qualitatively important the 
psychical factors may be, the latter will always 
be at the mercy of the former. The persistence 
of psychical development up to the present time 
argues for its persistence and co-existence with 
the physical in the future ; but Windelband needs 
to show by what natural process the realization 
of the norms is assured. " Inherent impor- 
tance " is insufficient. 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 137 

To me it seems that it makes no difference 
how closely the two sets of factors may be asso- 
ciated. A particular case of " right-and-its- 
circumstances " would, under the theory, have 
a greater survival-value than other groups of 
circumstances not containing " right." But it 
is not conceivable that the circumstances asso- 
ciated with right should always contain quanti- 
tative factoral preeminence. Therefore, it would 
have to be the qualitative factor often that 
effected the survival-value, and there would be 
bound to be the clash between quantitative and 
qualitative factors which I have described. 

III. THE PARALLEL BETWEEN DEN- 
KEN, FUHLEN, AND WOLLEN 

A. The Parallel between Dbnken and 
WOLLBN 
§ 5. Windelband says that, just as in Denken 
there is but one correct thought, so in Wollen 
there is but one right action. 19 This, however, 
is no true parallel. " Thing-to-be-thought " is 
made parallel with " moral decision " ; the true 
parallel would be between " thing-to-be-thought " 

19 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 63 ff. 



138 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

and " thing- to-be-done." But there is never one 
objective action which is right independently of 
the doer; there is no right or wrong with refer- 
ence to the matter of moral decision. Buying 
two $5 seats at the opera is not right or wrong 
in itself, but for a particular person under par- 
ticular circumstances. 

The fault of the parallel is in the supposition 
that there is the same possibility of latitude in 
thought as in action. We should be obliged to 
think according to the Kantian norms, if they 
exist. Parallel with such norms would be norms 
of willing which would compel us to act in ways 
regulated by them. In either case there is no 
choice open to us, no case where the norms 
might not operate. 

The Kantian epistemology has no place for 
incorrect thinking. According to it, objects of 
consciousness are particular groupings of em- 
pirical representations according to the laws of 
the understanding. Incorrect thinking, accord- 
ing to some of Kant's followers, is unclear 
arrangement of our perceptions. I ask whether, 
when we are compelled to make a moral de- 
cision, of the various alternatives presented, 
one, the moral, attracts us because it is so much 
clearer than any other? 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 139 

§ 6. Windelband's theory, in that it assures 
independence of one another to the several 
series of norms, unwarrantably isolates cog- 
nition, feeling, and will. Thought, aesthetic 
feeling, and moral decision may well be taken 
as types of highest development of these " fac- 
ulties"; but, even in their highest develop- 
ment, they can never become independent. The 
grounds of this objection are found in two con- 
siderations, (a) Windelband speaks of truth 
as the " end " of thought. " End," however, 
is a word used properly only where activity is 
present. As long as there is thought-activity, 
so long must the active (will) element be asso- 
ciated with the cognitive. Complete disassoci- 
ation would be possible only in the case of 
absolute passivity of thought, a condition which 
would be indistinguishable from unconscious- 
ness, (b) If the norms of moral decision were 
independent of those of cognition, we should 
have a situation where moral laws were present 
without any matter on which they might act; 
or the matter of moral decisions would be that 
of empirical representations. The former sup- 
position is absurd; under the latter, it would 
be necessary for the perceptions to be arranged 



140 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

in consciousness according to the laws of the 
understanding, before they could be of service 
for moral decision. In such a case, the norms 
of morality would be dependent on the logical 
norms. 

B. The Relation of Fuhlbn to Dun ken 

AND WOLLEN 

I shall discuss this portion of the subject 
together with the following section. 

IV. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE 
NORMS OF PARTICULAR CON- 
SCIOUSNESSES 
Windelband constantly writes as if he believed 
that the norms were operating in a world of 
matter and motion. This presupposition leads 
him to try to prove that they exist quite inde- 
pendently of particular consciousnesses. 20 In 
his proof, he makes much of the very portion 
of the Kantian position which has been assailed 
most vigorously, namely, the varying degree to 
which the norms are present to the conscious- 
ness of individuals. The fact that most men 
have but a hazy idea of norms of truth, beauty, 

20 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 81 ff. 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 141 

and morality is taken to argue for independent, 
objective existence. Before presenting Windel- 
band's arguments, it may be asked whether the 
independent, objective existence of norms which 
may at one time not be present to the conscious- 
ness of a particular individual, and again at 
another time may be present, does not pre- 
suppose that there are objective entities which 
may pass to and from the knowing situation? 
And if so, is not this to take away from con- 
sciousness the sole privilege of organizing the 
material of empirical representations? Does 
not this lead to realism? 

A. Single Laws of Logic, Morality, and 
Beauty 

It is argued that the norms, when actualized, 
exist independently of the consciousness in which 
the actualization occurs. Windelband presents 
two proofs, the one based on our judgment of 
their actualization in others, the other derived 
from our appreciation of their actualization in 
ourselves. 

§ 7. Norms are independent of the conscious- 
ness of the one in whom they are actualized 
because we give our approval or disapproval to 



142 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

such a one whether or not he is conscious of 
such a realization in himself. 21 

This argument is most plausible in the case 
of Denken. If we assume a realistic back- 
ground and the current presuppositions of sci- 
ence, we think of facts and the relations between 
facts as quite valid no matter whether there 
exist any perceiving consciousness at all. If 
we superimpose an idealistic epistemology, we 
still grant that the existence of a stable world 
stands or falls by the constancy and similarity 
of factual impressions. 

The case of Wollen, however, is different. 
That we are loath to give actions independent 
of conscious moral decision any ethical value so 
far as the agent is concerned, is shown by the 
fact that we do not grant that such actions have 
moral merit. Our praise or blame in such cases 
is the result of comparison with our own stand- 
ards. Without this comparison, there would 
be no " beautiful souls " who act morally from 
nature. I do not mean that, if the absolute 
value of our own moral standards be granted, 
such " souls " are not beautiful, but that, with- 
out recognition of their beauty by us, they would 

21 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 8l. 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 143 

have no moral value whatever. It is useless for 
Windelband to show that moral actions may be 
independent of the consciousness of the agent, 
unless he can also show that they are independ- 
ent of the consciousness of others at the same 
time. And what we assume as to independent 
existence in the case of the objects of thought, 
is insuperably difficult if applied to the case of 
moral laws, where divergence of opinion is so 
wide. Without any implication that moral laws 
and aesthetic judgments stand upon a similar 
basis, we may say that the same argument ap- 
plies equally well to the consideration of uncon- 
scious creation of beauty. 

§ 8. Some norms may excite approval or 
disapproval in the consciousness of the agent 
upon realization, without their actually being 
present to his consciousness. 22 

We can create a beautiful object or appreciate 
a work of art without thinking of aesthetic 
norms, which are rules of criticism. This is 
very true. But in his desire to avoid a sub- 
jectivistic basis of logic and ethic, Windelband 
has overreached himself a little in applying the 
same arguments to aesthetic. In the case of 

22 Id., II, 83. 



144 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

aesthetic judgments, there is a simple explana- 
tion of the phenomenon which he mentions, 
which entirely obviates the necessity of attrib- 
uting independence of consciousness to the 
norms. According to this view, aesthetic pleas- 
ure originates only when a cognitive element 
of consciousness stresses one aspect of feeling 
over other aspects. The more attention that is 
paid to special features of the object appreci- 
ated, and the more these special features are 
associated with other ideas in the mind, the 
greater the development of aesthetic feeling. 
Aesthetic rules may be formed upon introspec- 
tion, but they are merely the coming to self- 
consciousness of cognitive elements which were 
already present, although so tied up with the 
feeling elements that they were not separately 
recognized. Of course we do not need to have 
rules in order to feel beauty. Rules are the 
outcome of reflection over shades of feeling. 
But it is also true that the study of some aes- 
thetic system will aid very materially in later 
combinations of cognition and feeling in aes- 
thetic appreciation. One is not born a com- 
poser of beautiful music. No matter what may 
be the extent of the gift of musical feeling, it 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 145 

is necessary that the cognitive elements of har- 
mony be learned by hearing good music in which 
the harmony is present, and generally by a study 
of theory. Beethoven, born on an island where 
no music was ever heard, would likely have 
beaten a drum. 

In the case of aesthetic feeling, Windelband 
argued from the truth that artistic creation and 
aesthetic appreciation do not demand conscious- 
ness of norms of beauty. But this apparent 
independence does not hold true of logical and 
moral norms, as Windelband himself admits. 
Here, he says, the norms are concerned with the 
" deciding moment " 23 in the process, and so 
are of the very greatest value to the conscious- 
ness of the agent. We are not likely to perform 
a moral act, unless we are conscious of a stand- 
ard of morality in deference to which we choose 
to act in one way rather than in another! 

B. Realms of Laws of Logic, Morality, 

and Beauty 

It may be objected, in reply to my criticism of 

Windelband's parallel between Denken, Fuhlen, 

and Wollen, that it is difficult to demonstrate 

23 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 84. 



146 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

paiallelism between single laws of thought, 
single moral decisions, and single appreciations 
of beauty; but that it would be easier to defend 
the existence of three realms of laws of logic, 
morality, and beauty. Perhaps the inconsist- 
ency of the parallel is only apparent, and results 
from a different kind of relation of each of the 
realms to an individual, rather than from the 
point of view of the three realms themselves. 

It is puzzling to know how we are to conceive 
the three realms of norms. In what does their 
objectivity consist? If we adopt the Kantian 
standpoint, we might consider a moral norm 
objective in the same sense that the laws of the 
understanding are objective. The moral norm 
in question would accompany the logical laws 
by which the whole situation is conceived, and 
the whole would be a " right-situation. ,, But 
this objectivity would not be ontological, but 
epistemological. 

From the standpoint of realism, it is possible 
to assume that there is a pre-established har- 
mony between the psychological recognition of 
a right action and an objective " right " in- 
herent in a teleological universe — however the 
inherent " right " may collide at times with fac- 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 147 

tors of natural selection. This position, how- 
ever, is one that Windelband does not adopt. 
He is anxious to put the norms on the same 
footing with the laws of nature, and makes his 
appeal to the Kantian standpoint. 

§ 9. In order to show that there are three 
realms of norms influencing the logical, moral, 
and aesthetic " faculties " of man, it is neces- 
sary to demonstrate that there is a choice pre- 
sented, and that the norms point toward an 
action, thought, or feeling which would not be 
indicated clearly without them. Windelband's 
effort to prove the existence of such a choice is 
made in connection with his attempted demon- 
stration of a moral, a logical, and an aesthetic 
conscience, and with his belief that the factors 
operating in natural selection are inadequate to 
explain the facts. 

(a) He claims that the existence of a moral 
conscience in individuals cannot be accounted 
for by the law of survival. 24 For, he says, in 
order to effect a moral purpose, a man can use 
only a part of the means at his disposal. Other 
possible actions are forbidden him. Further- 
more, the older a civilization grows, the less 

24 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 77. 



148 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

moral it becomes, a fact which shows that nat- 
ural selection does not operate here in choosing 
a factor of permanent advantage. 25 But he says 
that in the case of nations the moral value is 
identical with the survival value. 

It seems to me that this argument overlooks 
a whole field of inquiry, in which moral con- 
science has been described in wholly psycho- 
logical terms. Man became conscious of actions 
that were at first instinctive, and the memory 
of previous actions furnished circumstances to 
be considered by the side of later actions. Com- 
pare, for example, J. S. Mill's description of 
conscience. 26 This theory is strengthened in 
consideration of the fact that consciences are 
so different, resting as they do upon different 
psychological equipments. Moral conscience 
would seem to be a very imperfect instrument 
whose function it is to indicate our needs with 
reference to action. It would be easier to argue 
for metaphysical objectivity, if we found more 
uniformity in moral consciences. Moral laws, 
framed at first in accordance with instincts, 
might well have been possessed of survival value 

25 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 79. 

26 Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism, Everyman ed., New York, 1910, 
p. 26. 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 149 

for primitive man. Windelband seems to be 
under the impression that survival-values, to be 
such, must be operative through the whole of 
their existence — which is not true. 

(b) Moreover, Windelband's argument by 
the use of the term " moral decision " is faulty. 
When we speak of moral decision, we have 
emerged from the strictly psychological field of 
inquiry into the logical field. Moral decision, 
however quickly we may make it, is a matter 
of judgment. Moral choice is the outcome of 
deliberation (Aristotle). In his discussion of 
conscience in evolution and moral decision, it 
seems to me that Windelband has deviated from 
the point at issue. We are trying to determine 
whether there is ontological objectivity in an 
action that is felt as right. Moral decision, 
brought about by standards of right, the out- 
come of education, is concerned with mediate, 
not immediate values. If there are such onto- 
logical entities as moral norms, they must oper- 
ate immediately, in the case of felt right; as, 
for instance, when I feel that such and such an 
action is right in itself. 

Now when I become introspective, I do not 
find any feeling of conscience immediately in- 



150 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

dining me to a way of acting. I find no actions 
which seem right or wrong in themselves. In 
every case where conscience enters, I find that 
I have been weighing possible actions, however 
brief may have been the process. I find my- 
self discriminating between different interests. 
Therefore, I cannot help concluding that actions 
in themselves are indifferent, and that moral 
distinctions are mediate. It is true that I am 
inclined to follow instincts, but I cannot find 
any moral quality as distinguished from instinct. 
I may say that moral distinctions grew out of 
my instincts, but nothing leads me to suppose 
that the distinctions themselves are anything 
but derivative. And, inasmuch as actions are 
meaningless from the standpoint of morality, 
when divorced from choice and deliberation, I 
conclude that the ontological objectivity of moral 
norms can only be defended by the supposition 
of a pre-established harmony. 

§ 10. Windelband says that logical norms 
lead us to truth. 27 Now from the Kantian 
standpoint this position is more easily defended 
than from that of realism. If logical laws and 
physical phenomena are all considered epistemo- 

27 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 84. 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 151 

logically, one may be objective in the same sense 
as the other. There is some difficulty in dis- 
covering any epistemological falsity at all, how- 
ever, for everything just is. 

But Windelband uses the Kantian argument 
to make his position plausible at the start. Then 
he switches over to the Lockian conception of 
knowledge as true knowledge. According to 
the latter conception, he thinks of the psycho- 
logical processes as having a great number of 
possibilities of association of " ideas " in vari- 
ous ways in any one situation. That which 
leads the mind to prefer one over all the other 
possibilities is the quality of normality which 
it possesses. Thus the norms of thought are 
neither identical with nor contrary to the gen- 
eral laws of association of ideas. I do not see 
how we can admit these possibilities of associ- 
ation if we keep to the Kantian standpoint. 
According to Kant, we have to think according 
to these laws. I repeat, the position of Windel- 
band here is more in accord with Locke, and 
we must consider the matter in connection with 
the implied realistic background. 

Where is truth? If it is the real as the object 
of judgment, as the realists tell us, I cannot see 
11 



152 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

where logical norms are demanded. In such a 
case, we should be led to truth simply by what, 
in the last analysis, is perception — of objects 
and relations. To suppose the existence of 
norms would be to believe that there is a special 
conspiracy on the part of nature to bring organic 
beings into harmony with it from their psycho- 
logical standpoint. From the standpoint of evo- 
lution this would be a hysteron proteron; and it 
would render natural selection useless. If, on 
the other hand, truth is in the judgment, it would 
seem to be mediate, insofar as there is presented 
the possibility of a number of judgments. But 
a logical truth of this kind, based on inference, 
is something quite different from immediate ap- 
proval of a correct thought. And logical truth 
ultimately traces back to perceptual phenomena, 
unless an idealistic complication is introduced. 
I cannot, therefore, see the necessity of suppos- 
ing ontologically objective norms of thinking. 
Epistemologically, they may be defended (with 
a problem as to the nature of the false idea). 
§ ii. The strongest argument for ontologi- 
cal objectivity is found in the case of so-called 
aesthetic norms. We recall James's discussion 
of the place of afTectional facts. 28 Beauty, as 

28 James, William, Essays in Radical Empiricism, 137-154. 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 153 

well as color and secondary qualities in general, 
can be thought of as a quality of the object. 
A beautiful vase so functions as to produce a 
feeling of immediate pleasure. I cannot prove 
that the beauty is entirely subjective any more 
than I can prove that secondary, or even pri- 
mary, qualities are entirely subjective. The 
pleasure of beauty may be only incidental. 
Why, then, does it seem more reasonable, ac- 
cording to my view, to consider the beauty as 
wholly psychological? 

Windelband says that one reason for con- 
sidering aesthetic norms objective is the fact 
that aesthetic appreciations cannot be accounted 
for on the basis of their survival by a process 
of natural selection. 29 He implies that there 
would be no need of supposing the existence of 
these norms, if such an account could be given. 
He says that, although it is true that there has 
been a gradual development of the nervous sys- 
tem in the case of organic nature, it is also true 
that the over-development of aesthetic ability is 
apt to be weakening, rather than strengthening. 

Now it seems to me that the preservation of 
aesthetic capabilities may be accounted for by 

29 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 79. 



154 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

natural selection. It has been observed that our 
aesthetic appreciations and our laws of beauty 
follow closely along the line of the structure of 
natural objects. Those organisms which har- 
monized with their environment would tend to 
survive. This would not preclude the possi- 
bility of later aesthetic development beyond the 
point of usefulness of the aesthetic factor as a 
survival value. A quite theoretical volume of 
appreciations might survive, for evolution casts 
off only dangerous developments, not harmless 
ones. If over-refinement led to weakness, the 
survival-value would assert itself on occasion. 
The primitive colors carry with them more 
aesthetic delight to an uncultured people than 
the more delicate shades. The rare colors give 
pleasure only to the " highbrow." Primitive 
colors, furthermore, are associated with many 
objects which have survival-reference. The 
warm colors, yellow and red, have pleasure 
associated with them perhaps because of their 
connection with the light of the sun and the 
warmth of fires. Cold blue is associated with 
the sea and sky; black, with the treacherous 
night. Observe, too, that the same object of 
appreciation may affect different individuals in 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 155 

wholly different ways. The general uniformity 
of taste may be accounted for on the principle 
of harmony of organic with inorganic nature. 
Even so, beauty might be considered to be 
ontologically objective. In such a case, nature 
would have to be regarded as conspiring to give 
aesthetic pleasure to some of its organic com- 
ponents. Beauty, to be ontologically objective, 
must be a principle in nature distinct from the 
utility which operates in natural selection; that 
is, it must be so, if we are ever to prove its 
existence, for, of course, we might have faith 
in eternal beauty without the least bit of evi- 
dence to prove that it exists. However, the 
psychological explanation seems to me to be 
entirely adequate, and the proofs advanced to 
establish an over-personal beauty seem incon- 
clusive. Therefore, it seems wisest to adhere 
to the simpler viewpoint. 

V. FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 

§ 12. After having attempted to show how 
norms and natural laws may fit into a single 
system, Windelband seeks to remove the Kantian 
dualism of a region of freedom and a region of 
natural law. His method is a consideration of 



156 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

the meaning of freedom. He aims to show- 
that freedom and determinism are not incom- 
patible. He says, 

Freedom is the determination of the empirical con- 
sciousness by consciousness of the norm. . . . This 
freedom is in no wise a mysterious ability to do some- 
thing for which no cause is present; it demands no 
exception to the continuity determined by nature of the 
phenomena of the life of the soul; but it is rather the 
ripest product of natural necessity, that through which 
the empirical consciousness places itself under the law 
of the consciousness of the norm. 30 

Aside from the notion of norms, I find myself 
in cordial agreement with Windelband in his 
contention that freedom and determinism are 
not incompatible. But Windelband seems to 
feel that norms somehow help to a reconcilia- 
tion, and in this I cannot agree with him. He 
seems to feel that freedom can be explained as 
a type of determination according to norms. It 
appears to me that nature is here regarded as 
static before possibilities of determination, on 
the one hand, according to quantitative factors 
of evolution, and, on the other, according to 

so Windelband, Praeludien, II, 88. 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 157 

normal, qualitative factors. Now if the Kantian 
dualism is to disappear, it seems most natural 
that quantitative and normal factors should 
work themselves out in a single system along 
deterministic lines. The theory, however, shows 
no reason why normal factors should prevail. 
This was my first criticism of norms, here re- 
peated with special reference to the discussion 
of freedom. 

I do not think that the reader of Windelband's 
arguments will be satisfied with his definition of 
freedom after a consideration of his subsequent 
discussion. Windelband escapes the main prob- 
lem of freedom by identifying freedom with a 
certain kind of determined processes. A human 
being cannot act outside of natural law in the 
carrying out of any plan. The means at his 
disposal are determined from the start; and, if 
he follows out a certain course of action, there 
is a chain of causation to whose links he must 
conform. When Windelband places freedom 
in a course of action determined according to 
consciousness of a norm, he appears to place it 
right in the causal series. 

It may be seen, however, that the issue does 
not lie here. Windelband speaks of the em- 



158 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

pirical consciousness " placing itself " (sich 
stellt) under the law of consciousness of the 
norm. In the next sentence he defines freedom 
as the " autonomy " with which the individual 
consciousness makes of a norm, known and 
recognized by it, a maxim of action. Now this 
autonomy by which the individual consciousness 
is able to put itself under the determination of 
one of several possible courses of action is a 
different sort of freedom from that of the pre- 
ceding definition of freedom as the " determi- 
nation of the empirical consciousness through 
the consciousness of the norm." In the case of 
the definition just quoted, nature is viewed as 
a battlefield wherein different laws, natural and 
normal, come into collision. The natural laws 
war among themselves, and the issue is decided 
by natural selection. The addition of norms 
to the forms of the evolution-process merely 
increases the number of laws which are at war. 
Now I take it that there are degrees of power 
among the factors of evolution, and that these 
degrees of importance are constant throughout 
the process of nature, so that there results a 
causal continuity. 

By Windelband's first definition, freedom 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 159 

would consist in the consciousness of the trans- 
ference of the action of an individual from one 
type of mechanistic series to another type of 
mechanistic series. " Freedom is nothing other 
than the consciousness of this determining power 
which the known and recognized norm is able 
to exercise over the thinking faculty and de- 
cision of the will." I interpret this to mean 
that norms are laws which exist only in relation 
to conscious beings; that natural laws reign 
supreme in inorganic nature; but that the indi- 
vidual conscious being is able to escape from 
the tyranny of an implacable mechanism by 
placing himself under the rule of higher laws 
which become operative only through the me- 
dium of consciousness. Now the important 
idea of this exposition is that consciousness 
makes a difference in the deterministic course 
of nature. Certain laws, norms, become oper- 
ative only when organisms become conscious of 
them. It is difficult, however, to see how aware- 
ness of norms, however influential a factor it 
may be, can itself be termed freedom, on the 
plea that this factor of awareness initiates cer- 
tain new deterministic lines. The awareness 
simply becomes one new factor. This fits in 



i6o VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

well with the argument for determinism, but it 
ill accords with the admission of freedom. Free- 
dom seems to have become identified with a 
process of awareness. 

The plausibility of Windelband's argument 
seems to lie in the implicit assumption of another 
kind of freedom for the individual in addition 
to the one which he has defined. This second 
kind of freedom is expressed by his use of the 
words " autonomy " and " places itself." Free- 
dom, according to this second conception, is 
something within the factor of awareness, not 
identical with it. Freedom is the ability of one 
who is aware to accept or reject the normal way 
of acting. Decision of the will is a decision 
involving choice of action on the part of the one 
who is aware. I do not feel that Windelband 
has escaped the real problem of freedom by the 
method which he has employed. The old dis- 
cussion of whether the will is free comes again 
to the fore; it has been buried only temporarily. 
How can a conscious being " place himself " 
under the rule of one of several kingdoms of 
law? Windelband's only implied answer is, 
" Through being conscious." He seems to feel 
that it is the peculiar glory of a conscious being 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 161 

to be able to make selective choice of factors 
which shall govern his action. He seems to feel 
that, by making norms part of a determined 
system, he has made freedom intelligible. But 
the real dispute, it seems to me, is not over the 
question as to how courses of action work out 
(as, for instance, whether or not they are in 
causal series), but over how the individual is 
able to choose one course of action rather than 
another, it being taken for granted that any 
course is determined in the process. And I 
cannot see how the introduction of norms helps 
the situation at all. It only adds a complication 
to the factoral-complex of possible actions — 
about whose possibility it is mainly disputed. 

This is no essay on determinism, indetermin- 
ism, and freedom, but a discussion of the rela- 
tion of Windelband's conception of norms to his 
conception of freedom. I think that it has been 
shown that the assumption of norms only em- 
barrasses the discussion, and that without norms 
we can as easily suppose several courses of 
possible action, any one of which may be com- 
pletely determined in the process. There is 
nothing to be gained by printing one of these 
courses of action in red letters! 



162 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

Windelband fears that his notion of freedom 
will be challenged on the ground that it does not 
do justice to the feeling of responsibility and to 
the existence of responsibility in general. 31 He 
feels it important, therefore, to examine the 
notion of responsibility. As he has been trying 
to reconcile the concept of freedom with some 
kind of determinism, it is not necessary to 
reconcile responsibility with his theory of deter- 
mination by norms. He feels that the crux of 
the question lies in the admission that acts of 
moral decision are caused. But, at the outset, 
he finds that causation and responsibility are 
not incompatible. In fact, if moral actions were 
not caused, there could be no responsibility; all 
would be mere chance. We are only respon- 
sible when we cause our actions. Wherein, 
then, lies our feeling of repugnance in the mat- 
ter of making responsibility contain causation? 
Windelband feels that it lies in the notion of 
necessity which we must attribute to cause and 
effect, if causation is to have any " objective 
character." He proceeds to analyze the con- 
cept of necessity (as distinguished from the 
time-relation of succession, discussed by Hume) 

31 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 88. 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 163 

into two meanings. One of these, the meaning 
of Wirkens, " power," is not further discussed. 
The other is said to be that of logical dependence 
of the special on the general, Gesetzmassigkeit, 
" according-to-lawness." 32 Now our repugnance 
in the matter of admitting causation into the 
conception of responsibility is evidently a feel- 
ing that Gesetzmassigkeit destroys freedom. 
Windelband quotes the work of Rickert in con- 
nection with the analysis of Ursachlichkeit, to 
the effect that many acts which are caused do 
not have a general law behind them. Such 
are all individual actions which never recur 
under exactly the same conditions. Therefore, 
Gesetzmassigkeit and Ursachlichkeit are not 
co-extensive; and, if this be true, responsibility 
would sometimes have to do with causal rela- 
tions which are not predetermined according to 
a general law. Windelband does not examine 
Rickert's arguments, but passes to a consider- 
ation as to where one finds the idea of necessary 
connection in the case of unique actions. He 
says that a man's willing and acting are caused 
by his character. 33 The obedience to law in the 

32 Id., II, 90. 

33 Id., II, 92. 



164 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

case of unique actions is found in the nature of 
character which sets forth a logical law of gen- 
eral nature; viz., if the circumstances were to 
be repeated (whether they are actually repeated 
or not), the man would act thus and so. Thus, 
"all effecting (Wirksamkeit) has epistemologi- 
cal meaning, and the logical form of Gesetz- 
massigkeit, even if its factual non-repetition or 
inability to be repeated excludes methodologi- 
cally its comparison with other examples." 34 
Therefore, the causal relation is never present 
without Gesetzm'dssigkeit , even if this be only 
epistemological. 

It is somewhat puzzling to gather the precise 
significance which Windelband wishes us to 
attach to his analysis of causation. If Rickert's 
position were sound, causation would be relieved 
of some of the burden imposed on it by deter- 
minism; and responsibility would be affected 
similarly by a softening of the conception of 
causality. Windelband, however, feels the need 
of retaining the notion of necessary connection 
in some sense, and he endeavors to soften the 
sense of Gesetzmassigkeit. This he does by 
showing that, in cases of unique action, obedi- 

34 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 92. 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 165 

ence to law is only to be understood epistemo- 
logically. Supporting himself on the Kantian 
epistemology, Windelband is able to juggle terms 
between the laws of phenomena and logical laws, 
with an ontological implication that, as the one 
realm is as real as the other, it is permissible to 
take from each in building up a theory. 

My criticism of the analysis of causation is 
that it is not to the point. It is certainly true 
that the causal relation exists between the act 
of moral decision and the subsequent action that 
is carried out, but the question is as to whether 
the causal relation exists between the norm and 
the act of decision. We may represent the 
matter more clearly by the use of symbols. Let 
n stand for norm, b for the act of moral decision 
of a conscious being, c for the subsequent action, 
R for relation, and C for causal. Now my 
position is that responsibility certainly involves 
b — RC — c. This is well established by Windel- 
band. The important question, however, is not 
what kind of causal relation this may be, but 
whether there is another causal relation between 
n and b; is n — RC — b true, in other words? 
Windelband escapes consideration of this prob- 
lem by using the ambiguous term " character " 



166 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

to cover both the norm and the act of decision, 
nb. He thinks that the difficulty connected with 
causation is settled by showing that nb — RC — c. 
But the matter is not settled by saying that 
" character determines willing and acting." He 
proves that an act of moral decision determines 
a subsequent action, by virtue of the " charac- 
ter " of the agent, and then assumes that there 
is no question as to determination within " char- 
acter," which contains at least the important 
elements of the act of moral decision and the 
presence of the norm. 

The point at issue is, Does the presence of 
the norm in the " character " determine the act 
of decision? This question can not be discussed 
without coming dangerously near assuming the 
discarded notion of " states of consciousness." 
A more psychological statement of the point at 
issue would be, Has a conscious being ability to 
reject or accept or choose between conscious 
impulses? This is the question whose answer 
is the answer as to whether man has freedom 
or not. 

This question is discussed subsequently by 
Windelband, and I shall criticize his treatment 
of it. He says that another objection brought 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 167 

against the association of responsibility with 
causal necessity in the case of willing and act- 
ing, is the fact that, by popular usage, respon- 
sibility always implies the belief that a man 
could have acted otherwise than he really did 
act. 35 Whereupon Windelband answers that the 
possibility of a variety of actions in a situation 
is true only of man " in abstracto " ; that a man 
" in concreto " could act otherwise only if he 
were otherwise. It is because his character is 
such as it is and because it has caused certain 
actions that we judge a man responsible for 
what he has done. 

Windelband here expressly denies that a man 
has any choice of possible actions. With it he 
implies that a man has no choice of possible 
decisions. The latter denial, to my mind, is 
the denial of the only kind of freedom that is 
worth anything. Observe two things. Note 
the confusion running through the argument 
with respect to willing and acting. Windel- 
band' s original discussion had to do with the 
parallel between Denken, Wollen, and Fuhlen. 
Now, when he is temporarily discussing Wollen 
alone, a stranger has made his appearance, 

35 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 93. 
12 



168 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

Handeln. We now read of Wollen and Han- 
deln. They are spoken of in the same breath, 
and it is just because of this juxtaposition that 
Windelband can profit by his confusion between 
an act of decision of the will (Wollen) and the 
physical process (Handeln) which follows the 
act of decision. 

Observe, in the second place, that responsi- 
bility as interpreted by Windelband is here 
brought in to prove that a man has no choice 
of possible actions. This goes well if we take 
it literally: a man can be responsible only for a 
causally determined action. But how can he be 
responsible for an act of decision if it be caus- 
ally determined? If an act of decision of the 
will is the effect of a determining cause, respon- 
sibility for the decision must rest with the cause, 
not with the man himself. 

Windelband has said that a man cannot act 
otherwise than is determined by his character. 
His proof, as we have seen, relies upon use of 
the term " character " in an ambiguous sense. 
The difficulty in the matter of application of 
responsibility to the cause is now discussed by 
him as a new difficulty. He now asks, What 
is responsible for the character: circumstances, 



THE THEORY OF NORMS r6Q 

society, or God? How can the individual be 
responsible for his character? " Als ob es noch 
irgendwie auszudenken ware, was das Indi- 
viduum im Unterschiede von seinem Charakter 
noch sein konnte!" 3 * In such a case, Windel- 
band says, a man's character would have to be 
doubled; he would have to have an empirical 
and an intelligible character, and thus we should 
have a metaphysical conception which would not 
agree with the causal element of the conception 
of responsibility. Windelband's solution is to 
locate responsibility in the judgment whereby 
we transfer our approval or disapproval of a 
function to the individual who functions. 37 

Windelband's main problem was to reconcile 
freedom with determinism. He found that, in 
order to do so, he would have to give an account 
of responsibility which would do full justice to 
it. His method was to show that causation and 
responsibility are not incompatible. We should 
suppose that he would find responsibility some- 
where in the series of causation, but he discovers 
that the problem of infinite regress is involved. 
He therefore concludes that, although causation 
in moral action is always associated with respon- 

36 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 94. 37 Id., II, 95. 



170 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

sibility, responsibility is only applied metaphor- 
ically to the person; that it is only a way of 
passing judgment on a portion of the causal 
series; that itself it is not a part of the causal 
series at all. How does this agree with Win- 
delband's method of showing that responsibility 
is not incompatible with determinism by norms 
on the ground that responsibility always involves 
the notion of causation ? If this notion of caus- 
ation is found ultimately to be of only meta- 
phorical application, has the objection to Win- 
delband's definition of freedom been removed 
by the location of a metaphorical causation in 
responsibility ? 

As to his objection that a man's character 
would have to be doubled in order to make it 
possible for him to change his character, I would 
reply that there is no more a problem here than 
there is in the facts that a conscious being pre- 
serves the memory of former experiences, or 
that one can make a judgment of approval or 
disapproval. The problem is contained in the 
question as to whether he can ever decide in 
favor of the less prominent factor. 

Windelband, as we have seen, has finally 
located responsibility in the judgment, and he 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 171 

believes that it is a great pedagogical means of 
getting oneself and others into the way of obedi- 
ence to norms. These laws, by their " inherent 
importance," are destined ultimately to prevail, 
and responsibility is one factor in the process by 
which they reach supremacy in the lives of indi- 
viduals. If it were not for Windelband's appli- 
cation of the term " responsibility " to persons 
rather than to functions, I should be inclined 
to suppose that responsibility, like norms, was 
taken to be one more factor in the evolutionary 
process. He may, indeed, regard it in this light. 
Judgments, then, would be determined, and we 
should have here simply a case of a very prag- 
matic function of the intellect in cooperation 
with the rest of the order of nature. But the 
memory of Windelband's use of the expressions 
" autonomy " and " places itself," together with 
his apparent belief that responsibility is not 
entirely a delusive thing, leads me to wonder 
whether he does not, in effect, locate freedom 
in the judgment. Does he not assume (though 
it is out of harmony with his arguments) that 
we can approve or disapprove according to our 
will, and that we can put ourselves under the 
rule of one or another set of factors? That we 



172 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

can teach others by our exercise of judgment of 
their actions? That we can do this in some 
real sense and not merely in conformity with a 
causal process? 

Unless something of this sort is felt by 
Windelband, I cannot see how the ethical sig- 
nificance of his doctrine is other than " laissez 
faire." If we have no real ability to bring the 
norms to bear on our lives and the lives of others, 
but just take part in the whole process of evolu- 
tion, with responsibility as a natural phenom- 
enon at work with the other factors, responsi- 
bility can be no more than a very involuntary 
pedagogical instrument, and the less mankind 
knows about Windelband's theory the better — 
that is, if it is not true! 

Windelband's general position is character- 
ized by passivity on the part of the individual 
to the forces which shape the course of develop- 
ment of body and mind. To be sure, he defends 
moral decision, and describes man as struggling 
upward, but the more powerful the attraction 
from the norms and the more merciless the evo- 
lutionary factors, the more evident it becomes 
that, so far as man is concerned, his battle is 



THE THEORY OF NORMS 173 

only a sham battle after all. Now that we have 
shown that obligation and responsibility cannot 
serve the pedagogical purpose which Windel- 
band ascribes to them, they become a mockery 
to life. We look over the universe, and, indeed, 
we see duty and responsibility as factors in the 
world-process, but the teleological goal toward 
which we are moving seems to contain all the 
life-activity within itself. The whole world 
seems as if it were being pulled toward that 
high goal. The struggle is between more and 
less powerful factors in the process. We feel 
that in Windelband's view human beings are 
the tools of factors. 

Without the support of any philosophy, one 
feels the need of a view of the universe by which 
he may take some part in the struggle, and help 
toward the attainment of the goal. The pop- 
ular idea of moral responsibility has some such 
background as this. We feel that the individual 
ought to have the means of doing some of the 
eliminating. We feel that a deterministic world 
is but one side of the truth. 

Although nothing in the previous discussion 
offer a basis for belief in such a different kind 
of universe, we may at least feel encouraged 



174 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

that it is not without the bounds of possibility, 
if Windelband's theory has been proved incon- 
sistent and untenable. 



CONCLUSION 

THE course of our discussion has led 
from the definition of two classes of 
values, immediate and contributory, 
and the discovery of their psychological basis in 
feeling and cognition, to a description of their 
natural history. First their origin in the earli- 
est stages of consciousness was described. The 
two types of valuing were held to signify two 
divergent directions of development of con- 
scious activity. It was emphasized, however, 
that neither of these ever occurs in isolation 
from the other, but that, rather, one was more 
prominent at a given time than the other. 

Next the relation of the judgment to values 
was discussed. In the act itself, it was found 
that all judgments are contributory. The value 
of the content of the judgment, however, de- 
pends upon the future usefulness of the content. 
All true judgments were found to be contribu- 
tory as to content, and also certain false judg- 
ments. The comparatively small group of judg- 
ments of value was treated briefly. It was noted 
that immediate values first find expression in 

175 



176 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

the judgment, and that the expression of con- 
tributory values grows out of judgments of 
immediate values. At a subsequent stage of 
development, however, contributory values be- 
come free from previous cognition of the means 
as immediate values. 

Chapter V carried on the natural history of 
values by discussing their interrelation. This 
topic concerned the relation of the individual to 
his environment through the expansion of his 
interests. The biological point of view was 
adhered to, and it was discovered that con- 
scious activity is related to environment directly 
through feeling and cognition. Thereupon it 
was shown how everything with which con- 
scious activity comes into contact is valuable 
both from the immediate and from the con- 
tributory points of view. Some practical con- 
sequences of this fact were deduced. 

Early in our discussion (Chapter II), we dis- 
posed of a theory which claimed to prove the 
existence of ontologically objective norms of 
truth. Part II examined in detail Windelband's 
theory of norms. The writer believes that he 
has proved that Windelband's position, in spite 
of its containing broad and suggestive state- 



CONCLUSION 177 

ments, is self-contradictory, confused in outline, 
and untenable. It is desirable, in conclusion, to 
indicate our attitude toward those moral and 
aesthetic values which are so commonly recog- 
nized by human beings. 

We must bear in mind that we seek an in- 
terpretation that is psychological and biological. 
All values and standards of value, it is true, in- 
asmuch as they are entities of one kind or 
another, must have their place in a metaphysical 
account of the universe. But throughout this 
book it has been our care to disentangle the 
psychological and the biological from the meta- 
physical, and to deal with only the former. In 
a complete account of values, the metaphysical 
side must not be neglected, but we have not at- 
tempted to give a complete account. Our attack 
on Windelband's position is not so much an 
attack on the theory that there are ontologically 
objective norms of thinking, willing, and feel- 
ing, as an attack on the attempt to demonstrate 
the existence of such norms from psychological 
data. 

We have referred to J. S. Mill's description of 
conscience 1 . This description is an excellent 

1 Page 148. 



178 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

psychological account of the growth of stan- 
dards of moral value. It runs as follows : 

The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard 
of duty may be, is one and the same — a feeling in our 
own mind ; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on vio- 
lation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures 
rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it 
as an impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested, 
and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and 
not with some particular form of it, or with any of the 
merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Con- 
science; though in that complex phenomenon as it 
actually exists, the simple fact is in general all encrusted 
over with collateral associations, derived from sym- 
pathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all the 
forms of religious feeling; from the recollections of 
childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, 
desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even 

self-abasement Its binding force, however, 

consists in the existence of a mass of feeling which must 
be broken through in order to do what violates our 
standard of right, and which, if we do nevertheless 
violate that standard, will probably have to be encoun- 
tered afterwards in the form of remorse. Whatever 
theory we have of the nature or origin of conscience, 
this is what essentially constitutes it. 

In terms of our theory of values it is evident 
that any individual act demanded by conscience 
in view of a standard of morality is related to 



CONCLUSION 179 

consciousness in two ways. First there is the 
feeling-aspect. Mill well describes how the feel- 
ing commonly called "conscience" arises as the 
consequence of certain inhibitions and asso- 
ciated ideas. While the peculiar character of 
the feeling of conscience is thus dependent upon 
the matter to which the feeling is attached, it is 
no less true that, as one aspect of the relation 
of the individual to the act, the feeling of con- 
science, like other feelings, is a relation of im- 
mediate value. Obedience to the dictate of con- 
science brings with it a feeling of pleasure; dis- 
obedience results in a feeling of the unpleasant. 
The associated matter has not changed feeling 
to something new and original; it has merely 
heightened and intensified it. 

In the second place, any act the fulfilment of 
which is demanded by conscience, is related to 
consciousness also on the cognitive side. Here 
must be taken into account moral judgment. 
Any act that is the outcome of a decision in view 
of some moral standard and is not merely a 
habitual response prompted by some former de- 
cision, involves moral choice and deliberation. 
Here there is a rivalry among possible courses 
of action, and some principle of action emerges. 



180 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

Such principles are always judgments of values. 
What A. J. Balfour 2 calls "subordinate ethical 
propositions" are judgments of contributory 
values 3 . "I ought to make a true statement in 
this particular instance" may be subordinate to 
the "fundamental" ethical proposition "I ought 
to speak the truth." The fundamental propo- 
sition, however, is a judgment of immediate 
value. The word "ought" simply indicates that 
the feeling of liking is associated with a group 
of psychological factors in such a way that we 
name it a feeling of obligation. 

Two correlated topics require brief mention. 
First, the psychological processes involved in the 
formation of standards do not necessitate our 
consideration. They are identical with the de- 
velopment of concepts as described in any 
elementary psychology. Secondly, the point of 
view that we have adopted in no wise conflicts 
with the logical account of ethical propositions 

2 A. J. Balfour, A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, 342. 

3 If it be objected that the "subordinate" ethical propo- 
sition contains the word "ought" as well as the "funda- 
mental" proposition, and that therefore it too is a judgment 
of immediate value, let it be remembered that we defined 
an immediate value as a given good, "intrinsic, self-sufficient" 
(page 8). According to Mr. Balfour's definition of a "sub- 
ordinate" ethical proposition, the ought of such a proposition 
is not self-sufficient, but ever dependent upon the intrinsic 
ought of its "fundamental" proposition. 



CONCLUSION 181 

given so acutely by Balfour. In reference to 
the fundamental ethical proposition, we do not 
have to explain why we have such immediate 
values, any more than we have to explain why 
there are such entities as value relations at all. 
It is interesting, however, to observe that 
logically, if certain statements of obligation are 
a priori, so also is there a contributory factor 
present in every a priori statement of obligation. 
"I ought to speak the truth" means — if it have 
any meaning at all for any individual — "I ought 
to say words that are contributory to truth- 
telling. ,, 

There are two principal methods of investi- 
gation of aesthetic facts which are pursued by 
philosophers of aesthetics. One method is satis- 
fied with a wholly empirical, psychological treat- 
ment of the facts of appreciation of the beautiful 
as exhibited in individuals and races. A phil- 
osopher who finds his whole interest in this 
standpoint will be concerned with questions re- 
lating to the origin and development of such 
appreciations. I have already suggested 4 that 
natural selection may be a potent factor in the 

4 Pages 153-154- 



182 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

determination of what is recognized as beauti- 
ful. Among cultured persons, however, the 
great mass of aesthetic appreciations has lost its 
survival-reference. Just how far this is true 
would be a matter for empirical investigation. 
An empirical inquiry will also be concerned with 
an investigation of such principles as may be 
found to underlie the "secondary" systems of 
later development. Throughout the whole 
course of an empirical treatment, it should be 
borne in mind that, psychologically speaking, 
the aesthetic experience is one of feeling, not of 
cognition. But an empirical account will pass 
beyond a mere assignment of experiences to a 
particular aspect of consciousness, to a con- 
sideration of the cognitive elements to which the 
feeling-experiences are attached. Only on this 
basis are we justified in introducing such sub- 
jects as relation to natural selection, develop- 
ment of aesthetic standards, etc. If an em- 
pirical account is to be given, however, let it be 
wholly empirical, and let care be taken not to 
allow metaphysical assumptions to creep into the 
discussion. 

On the other hand, quite a different treatment 
is possible. The aesthetic philosopher may con- 



CONCLUSION 183 

sider the metaphysical significance of the em- 
pirical facts of aesthetic appreciation. The 
psychological investigator need not be hostile to 
his metaphysical coworker; he would better be 
his friend. But it should be understood that the 
two methods are quite separate and distinct. 
What, then are the principles according to which 
the aesthetic metaphysician shall proceed ? 

They are the same as those employed by other 
metaphysical philosophers. In our day there 
has been much protest against the cut and dried 
systems of the older philosophers, and a cor- 
responding satisfaction in everything that pre- 
tends to empiricism. I believe, however, that the 
only justification of this point of view lies in the 
facts that classical metaphysics had at its dis- 
posal fewer scientific facts than are now avail- 
able, and that it often was willing to neglect such 
facts as were then known. With a sober view of 
the known facts, however, it is still a legitimate 
human impulse to want to transcend the facts 
in some measure and to ground the contingent 
in what is permanent. The philosophic impulse 
of Rickert and Windelband must be recognized 
as valid and admirable ; fault is to be found only 
with their method — their attempt to deduce 
metaphysical truths from psychological data. 
13 



184 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

The problem of a satisfactory and valid 
method in metaphysical research would seem to 
resolve itself into the question of how to utilize 
empirical data without utilizing them wrongly. 
We may make the following suggestions: Let 
the metaphysican frankly base his system upon 
a dogmatism. Let him announce his faith in 
the "real" existence of what he cannot prove to 
exist in the way in which he assumes its exis- 
tence. Let him work out to the full all the im- 
plications that arise from his assumptions. But 
he should not be content to rest his faith in arbi- 
trary assumptions, even though he must neces- 
sarily be arbitrary in the act of assuming. He 
should look over the body of facts that are 
known in his particular field. Then let him 
make bold guesses as to some trans-empirical 
reference of certain of the facts of observation. 

It may be objected that any dogmatic method 
is a waste of time because it can never reach 
ascertainable facts. Against the objection it 
may be urged that, empirically speaking, it is a 
human impulse to want to transcend the facts, 
and that, indeed, the roots of all scientific re- 
search are embedded in metaphysical assump- 
tions. It is entirely possible, also, that, in the 



CONCLUSION 185 

future, some metaphysical system may be ac- 
cepted generally as being more comprehensive 
than any other, in view of all the facts known 
in every field of human experience. The build- 
ing of many systems, therefore, would be con- 
tributory to the formulation of such an inclusive 
system. While inclusiveness would not be a 
guarantee of truth, such a system, nevertheless, 
might claim the same degree of certainty as that 
attained in the formulation of laws of nature. 

There is, therefore, a wide field of investi- 
gation in ethic and aesthetic for the meta- 
physician to explore. If he be frank and sincere 
as to the element of dogmatism in his system, 
there is no reason why he might not attempt to 
correlate a realm of norms of beauty with a 
realm of ethical values. Let him, however, not 
attempt to extend expirical data from psy- 
chology and biology into a trans-empirical realm 
of being, without recognizing the necessity of 
dogmatism. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED * 

Balfour, Arthur James. 

A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, being an 
essay on the Foundations of Belief. By Arthur 
James Balfour, M.A., M.P. London. Mac- 
millan and Co. 1879. . . . 

Bergson, Henri. 

Creative Evolution. By Henri Bergson. . 
. . Authorized translation by Arthur Mitchell, 
Ph.D. New York. Henry Holt and Company. 
1911. 

Dewey, John. 

Essays in Experimental Logic. By John 
Dewey. The University of Chicago Press. 
Chicago, Illinois. [1916.] 

James, William. 

Essays in Radical Empiricism. By William 

James. Longmans, Green, and Co 

New York. . . . 1912. 



1 A good general bibliography of the subject of values is 
to be found in The Philosophical Status of Values, by J. E. 
Dashiell, 1913. New York (Columbia dissertation). Cf. the 
citations in Valuation, Its Nature and Laws, by W. M. Urban, 
1909, London and New York. 

187 



188 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

Locke, John. 

An Essay concerning Human Understanding. 
By John Locke. Collated and annotated, with 
Prolegomena, biographical, critical, and his- 
torical, by Alexander Campbell Fraser. . . . 
In two volumes. . . . Oxford at the Claren- 
don Press. M. DCCC. XCIV. 

Kallen, Horace M. 

Value and Existence in Philosophy, Art, and 
Religion. By Horace M. Kallen. 

Being pages 409-467 in: 

Creative Intelligence. Essays in the Prag- 
matic Attitude. By John Dewey, Addison W. 
Moore, Harold Chapman Brown, George H. 
Mead, Boyd H. Bode, Henry Waldgrave Stuart, 
James Hayden Tufts, Horace M. Kallen. New 
York. Henry Holt and Company. [191 7.] 

Marvin, Walter T. 

The Emancipation of Metaphysics from Epis- 
temology. By Walter T. Marvin. 

Being pages 48-95 in: 

The New Realism. Cooperative Studies in 
Philosophy. By Edwin B. Holt, Walter T. 
Marvin, William Pepperrell Montague, Ralph 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 189 

Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin, and Edward 
Gleason Spaulding. New York. The Mac- 
millan Company. 19 12. . . . 

Mill, John Stuart. 

Utilitarianism. By John Stuart Mill. Four- 
teenth impression. Longmans, Green and Co. 
. . . London, New York and Bombay. 1901. 

MUNSTERBERG, HUGO. 

The Eternal Values by Hugo Munsterberg. 
Boston and New York. Houghton Mifflin Com- 
pany. The Riverside Press. Cambridge. 1909. 

RlCKERT, HEINRICH. 

Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Einfuhrung 
in die Transzendentalphilosophie. Von Hein- 
rich Rickert, Professor an der Universitat 
Freiburg i. B. Zweite, verbesserte und er- 
weiterte Auflage. Tubingen und Leipzig. 
. . 1904. 

Russell, Bertrand. 

Our Knowledge of the External World as a 
Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. By 
Bertrand Russell, M.A., F.R.S. . . . The 



■igo VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 

Open Court Publishing Company. Chicago. 
London. . . . 1914. 

Titchener, Edward Bradford. 

Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of 
Feeling and Attention. By Edward Bradford 
Titchener. New York. The Macmillan Com- 
pany. 1908. . . . 

WlNDELBAND, WlLHELM. 

Praludien. Aufsatze und Reden zur Phil- 
osophic und ihrer Geschichte. Von Wilhelm 
Windelband. Funfte, erweiterte Auflage. 
[Two volumes.] . . . Tubingen. 

1915. 



INDEX 



Accountability, 126-127 ; see 
Responsibility. 

Act, judgment in the, 54, *57- 
59, *66-67. 

Actualization of norms, 141. 

Additive character of judg- 
ments, 73. 

Agent; see Standpoint of indi- 
vidual. 

Aesthetic values: subjective 
or objective? 16, 122; their 
presence to individual con- 
sciousness, 143-145 ; argu- 
ment for their objectivity, 
152-155; empirical and meta- 
physical treatment of, 181- 
183. 

Affection, Wundt's dimensions 
of, 95- 

Allegory, use of, 71. 

Anthropocentric attitude re- 
jected, 37-38. 

Appreciation in relation to 
valuation, 22. 

Aristotle, 149. 

Aspects of conscious activity 
never isolated, *I2, 41, 50, 
*96-98, 104. 

Association, 151. 

Attention and feeling, 94-96. 

"Autonomy," 160, 171. 

Awareness of norms, 159. 

Balfour, Arthur James, 132- 
133, 180. 



Beauty: subjective or objec- 
tive? 16; see Feeling, 
Aesthetic. 

Beethoven, 145. 

Bergson, 51; (implied refer- 
ence to,) 101. 

Biological concomitants of 
values, *37, 88, 90. 

Causal sequence of natural 
phenomena, 134, 157. 

Causation and responsibility, 
162-172. 

Cause : distinguished from 
means and from con- 
tributory values, 34; of 
judgment in the act, *57, 66. 

Character, Windelband's anal- 
ysis of, 163-172. 

Choice, said to be determined 
by the functioning of norms, 
147-150; see Freedom. 

Civilization, growth of, in 
reference to norms, 147-149. 

Classification: of values, 7-8; 
of disputed values, 15-16. 

Clearness: a criterion of at- 
tention, 95; a neo-Kantian 
criterion of truth, 138. 

Cognition : as psychological 
basis of contributory values, 
9; an aspect of conscious 
activity, 96-98; and growth 
of the environment, 99; and 



191 



192 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 



aesthetics, 144-145; and con- 
science, 179-180. 

Cognitive elements: may be 
different in memory from 
the original perception, 50; 
in relation to feeling, 91-92. 

Colors, 154. 

Concepts and standards of 
value, 180. 

Conscience, 124, 126-127, 148- 
150, 177-180. 

Consciousness : earliest stage 
of, (r) in reference to 
value, 36, 106, (2) in refer- 
ence to the conditions which 
cause us to ascribe value to 
it, 37, 45 ff., (3) in reference 
to its aspects, 97-98; and 
environment, 88-89, 93-112; 
one in its functioning, *97~ 
98, 108-109, 139, 166; mature 
stage of, in; of individuals 
with reference to norms, 
132-133, 140-155- 

Contact with environment: in 
reference to interest, 64; in 
reference to determination 
of the environment, 86-87, 
92-93; two aspects of, 94- 
-112; new, 106-111. 

Contemplation, 97. 

Content: of judgments, 55, 59- 
73; of false judgments, 67- 
69. 

Contributory: acts of judg- 
ment are, 59; content of 
judgment may be, 59 ff., con- 
tributory judgments ex- 
pressed in language, 80-83; 
contributory relation of the 



individual to environment, 
104-112; contributory values 
are objective, 119- 121; con- 
tributory element in the 
fundamental ethical propo- 
sition, 181. 

Creative Intelligence, 90. 

Criteria of truth and value, 63. 

Definitions, 62-63. 

Degrees of contributory value, 

65, 69-73. 

Desire: object of, 78-83; end 
of, 80-83. 

Determinism, 42; its relation 
to freedom, 155-172. 

Dewey, John, 26. 

Directions of the develop- 
ment of conscious activity, 
50. 

Dissociation of personality, 
in. 

Dogmatism, 184-185. 

Duty, 178. 

Education, 149. 

Ego-centric, 65. 

Emphasis: different in the 
several aspects of conscious 
activity, 12. 

Empirical account of aesthetic 
values, 181-182. 

"Empirical" consciousness, 158. 

End: of judgments as values, 
64, 68, 69; of desire ex- 
pressed in judgment, 80-83; 
of contributory values, 7-14, 
120; of thought, 139. 

Environment : simplest form 
of, containing value-relation, 



INDEX 



193 



45; growth of, 47; special, 
of individual and race, 72-73 ; 
definition of, 85-93 ; relation 
of, to conscious activity, 98; 
and values, 104-112. 

Epiphenomenalism, 95-98. 

Epistemology : in reference to 
metaphysics, +24, 123, *I28- 
133; in reference to the 
psycho-physical problem, 88; 
and truth, 131-132, 150-152, 
idealistic, 142; and ob- 
jectivity, 146; and obedience 
to law, 164-165. 

Error, explained with diffi- 
culty in Kantian terms, *i3i- 
132, 138, 151. 

Esquimaux, 109-110. 

Ethical propositions, 180. 

Evolution: end of valuation 
in, 64-65; and norms, 134- 
137. 

"Experience", gaining of, nr. 

Expression of values: see 
Language. 

"Faculty-psychology" depre- 
cated, 96-97; see Aspects. 

False judgments may be con- 
tributory, 60, 66-69. 

Feeling: as basis of immediate 
values, 10; in reference to 
sensations and ideas, *45- 
51, 91-92; expressed in lan- 
guage, 79-80; and attention, 
94-95; its part in conscious 
experience, 95-104; see 
Aesthetic, Conscience. 

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 124. 



Freedom, 126, +155-172. 
Freedom, value in relation to, 

1 19-125. 
Future action and judgments, 

59-73- 

Goal of the universe, 173. 
Hume, David, 162. 

Idealism, 69. 

Immediate values : self-suffi- 
cient, 10; independent of 
cognition, 35; arise out of 
contributory values, 48; ex- 
pressed in judgment, 78-80; 
and relation of the indi- 
vidual to his environment, 
105-112; subjective or ob- 
jective? 121-125. 

Impulse : often associated 
with feeling in immediate 
values, 11-12; egoistic and 
altruistic, 65. 

Independence: of contributory 
values, 13; of norms from 
particular consciousnesses, 
132-133, +140-155- 

Inference : in reference to en- 
vironment, 92-93 ; truth 
alleged to be independent of, 
123. 

Instinct, 150. 

Interactionism, 89. 

Interest: incidental to truth of 
judgments, 30, 64; necessary 
to all valuation, 35 ; in refer- 
ence to the origin of values, 
*38 ff., 92; in reference to 



194 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 



judgment, 59, *67, 77, 79: 
in reference to moral 
choice, 150. 
Interrelation of values, (1) 
with respect to origin, 31- 
53, (2) with respect to 
knowledge, 54-84, (3) with 
respect to co-existence, 85- 

115. 
Introspection, 95-98, 109. 

Intuition, 101. 

James, William, 26, 105, 109, 
122, 151, 152. 

Judgment: acts of, 57-59; con- 
tent of, 59-73 5 and memory, 
60; when present, 66-67; 
and moral choice, 149-150; 
and truth, 152; and respon- 
sibility, 169-172; moral, 179- 
180. 

Judgments : are all of con- 
tributory value, *i6-i7, 121 ; 
existential, 23, 26, 65; not 
essential to valuation, 10, 
32-33 ; in reference to 
standpoint, 54; as the 
climax of development of 
the cognitive function, 55; 
as values, 56-76; true, *6i- 
66, 131-132; false, *66-69, 
131-132; of values, 70, *76- 
83; origin of, 77-83; in form 
of general propositions, 82- 
83. 

Kallen, Horace M., 105. 
Kant, Immanuel, 123-124, 128- 
133. 



Knowledge: not essential to 
the presence of values, 10, 
32-33; the interrelation of 
values with respect to, 54- 
84; logical, the best instru- 
ment for dealing with 
reality, 99; not determined 
by feeling, 100- 101. 

Language, expression of 

values in, 54-55, *76-83- 
Laws of nature in reference 

to norms, 129-133. 
Locke, John, 122, 151. 
Logical values so-called : 

see Judgment, Knowledge, 

Norms, Truth. 

Marvin, Walter T., 24, 128-129. 

Materialism, 88-89. 

Matter of moral decisions, 
137-140. 

Metaphysical account of 
values, 177, *i82-i85. 

Method of metaphysical re- 
search, 183-185. 

Mill, John Stuart, 148, 177, 
178: 

Mind and body, 88-89, 172. 

Moral values : subjective or 
objective? 16, 122; and 
natural selection, 137; paral- 
leled by Windelband with 
other norms, 137-140; and 
moral decisions, 142-143, 
148-150. 

Miinsterberg, Hugo, 124. 

Music, 144-145. 



INDEX 



195 



Natural selection, 124, *I34- 
137, *I47-I55, 158. 

Necessity: of judgment, 22, 
27 ; Windelband's analysis 
of, 162-164. 

Norms : Rickert's views of, 
*20-30, 123 ; Windelband's 
theory of, 126-174; denned, 
126-127; relation to Kant, 
128-133; and evolution, 134- 
137; three kinds of, 137-140; 
independence of, from par- 
ticular consciousnesses, 132- 
133, *i40-r5S; degrees of 
presence of, 132, 140-141 ; 
in reference to freedom and 
responsibility, 155-172. 

Ob j ective : in reference to in- 
dependence, 14; meaning of, 
1 19-123; attractiveness of 
the theory of objective im- 
mediate values, 124; see 
Norms, Realms. 

Obligation, feeling of, 180. 

Observer: see Standpoint. 

Opposition : removal of, in 
Fuhlen, Denken, and Wol- 
len, 29; overcoming of, by a 
primitive organism, 40. 

Origin: of values, 31-53; is 
from the observer's stand- 
point, 35; of judgments, 77- 
83; of immediate values, 78- 
80; of contributory values, 
80-83. 

"Ought," meaning of, 180. 

Parallelism of realms of 
norms: see Realms. 



Perception: and judgment, 22, 
28; and environment, 92- 
93; and truth, 123, 152. 

Permanence of content of 
judgments as values, 60. 

Plants, 106-107. 

Pleasantness-unpleasantness, 
95-104; the "dimension" of 
feeling, 95; always present 
in conscious activity, 96-98; 
practical consequences of 
our theory, 99-104; in refer- 
ence to conscience, 178-179. 

Practicality and judgments, 

71-73. 
Pragmatism, 88-92. 
Pre-disposition, philosophical, 

88-89. 
Pre-established harmony, 133, 

146, 150, 152, 155. 
Protoplasm, 40, 87, no. 
Psychology: basis of values 

in, 10-12; concerned with 

Sein, 24; and environment, 

88-89; and conscience, 148. 
Psycho-physical parallelism, 89, 

95-98. 
Purpose : expressions of, 81 ; 

in nature, 135-136. 

Qualitative and quantitative 
importance of norms, 135- 
137, 156-157. 

Realism : in Windelband's 

theory, *I29-I33, 140-141, 

151 ; "naive," 133. 
Reality : quantitative aspect of, 

91 ; my contact with, *ioo- 

104, 112. 



196 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 



Realms of norms, 145-155. 

Recognition, alleged to be a 
factor in immediate valu- 
ation, 20-21. 

Reflection, feelings accom- 
panying, 49. 

Relation of false terms, 68-69. 

Relations, real, 61-64. 

Religion, 102-104. 

Responsibility, 124, 126- 127, 
*I55-I72. 

Rickert, Heinrich, *2i-30, 100, 
123, 125, 163, 183. 

Russell, Bertrand, 26. 

Secondary qualities, 122-123. 

Selection and norms, 130-131. 

Sensation: "simple," 46, 109; 
a pragmatic use of, 91 ; in 
reference to environment, 
92-93; as not exhaustive of 
the possibilities of relation 
with the environment, 100; 
definition of, no. 

Situation, earliest value-, 38-42. 

Sollen and Sein, 23 ff. 
Spectator: see Standpoint. 
Spiritualism, 89. 
Standards of value, 177-178; 
see Norms. 

Standpoint: of individual (1) 
defined, 34, (2) in expression 
of values, 76; of observer 
defined, 34; of individual 
and observer compared as 
methods, 44; in reference to 
judgment, 54 ff. ; merging 



of, in judgment, 55, 60, 70; 
confusion of, by some 
writers, 76; development of 
the individual's, 104-112. 

Stimuli: calling forth judg- 
ment, 57 ; in reference to a 
definition of environment, 
87, 92-95, 106- 1 12. 

Subjective: in reference to de- 
pendence, 14; meaning of 
the term, 1 19-122. 

Survival-value, 136; see Nat- 
ural. 

Terms: and relations, 27-28; 

of judgment, 60-73. 
Theoretical judgments, 73. 

Titchener, Edward Bradford, 
94. 

Truth: is it a value? 15, 123; 
as immediate, 25 ; involves 
inference, 26; of judgments 
in reference to value, 60-66; 
Kantian difficulty in refer- 
ence to, 131 -132; and norms, 
150-152. 

Uncognized values, 34-35. 

Unity of conscious activity: 
see Aspects. 

Usefulness of judgments: see 
Contributory. 

Value: relational character of, 
9-10, 119; and truth, 63-66; 
alteration of, 112; function 
and, 1 19-120. 



INDEX 



197 



Values: two classes of, 3-4, 7- 
8; from standpoint of ob- 
server are contributory, 43; 
present in earliest stage of 
consciousness, 48; acts of 
judgment as, 57-59; content 
of judgments as, 59-73; co- 
existence of, 85-112; and 
environment, 104-112; new, 
iio-iii; see Aesthetic, Con- 
tributory, Feeling, Inter- 



relation, Judgment, Know- 
ledge, Logical, Moral, 
Norms, Origin. 

Verification : of contributory 
values, 13, 20; of judgments, 
55, 61-62; implies the possi- 
bility of false judgments, 69. 

Windelband, Wilhelm, 126-174, 
183. 



